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While John Milton’s epoch was dominated by religious fervor and ongoing 
attempts to redefine Christianity, his epic, Paradise Lost, is dominated by his own 
religious fervor and his attempts to define Christianity as a religion of free will. 
Ostensibly a religious poem, Milton’s epic expansion of the Christian creation story is 
also a consolidation of his thoughts on all matters personal, political, and theological, 
which can be distilled down to the idea that, “Man is the occasion of his owne miseries” 
(The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce 934).1  In addition to its theological 
underpinnings, Paradise Lost, originally published in 1667, not long after the 1660 
restoration of the English Monarchy, incorporates a veiled manifesto of republican 
political ideology, as well a suggestive primer on marriage and personal relations. The 
common thread that runs through all of Milton’s personal, political, and theological 
thinking is the importance of self-determination. Milton’s chief concern with his poem is 
the assertion that free will is an integral part of Christianity, that free will existed in the 
Garden of Eden and continues to exist up to the present as an essential part of what it 
means to be human, and that everything good that the Christian God stands for is based in 
his gift of free will. Paradise Lost is Milton’s declaration that in all things self-
determination is both morally right as well as practically necessary in order to 
authenticate an individual’s behavior as what they intended it to be. It is his declaration 
that to be truly responsible for one’s actions, one must be free to choose those actions, or 
                                                
1 All citations from Paradise Lost are from the Riverside Milton, which follows the 1674 text, divided into 
twelve books rather than ten. For further explication, please refer to the headnote on p. 327 regarding the 




to choose to have acted otherwise. Furthermore, he declares that freedom of the will is 
the way of the world; it is the way God planned it, and the way God wants it to be. 
Paradise Lost, in addition to being an expansion upon the creation story, is also 
Milton’s interpretation of scripture which emphasizes spiritual themes such as the 
beneficence and mercy of God and the redemption of humanity through the sacrifice of 
His son.  Albert Labriola maintains that,  
as a biblical epic, Paradise Lost is an interpretation of Scripture: a 
selection of biblical events, their design and integration according to 
dominant spiritual themes…. Imprinted in the epic are Milton’s personal 
circumstances…goodness in the cyclical panorama of history will have its 
spokesperson and, ultimately, will prevail. (181)  
But while there are numerous spiritual themes that Milton emphasizes in Paradise Lost, 
the dominant spiritual theme that dictates his selection of events and their integration into 
the fabric of the design of Paradise Lost is the central importance of free will. He uses his 
epic to aver that the triumph of goodness is dependent upon the self-determination of 
each individual, because without it there can be no authentic goodness. Mankind and free 
will are as wedded together as Adam and Eve, and all the good that happens to mankind 
as well as all the justice he may receive flow through God’s gift of self-determination.  
 As an interpretation of scripture, Paradise Lost includes embellishments as well 
as outright alterations to the Biblical story of Adam and Eve, expanding what had 
originally been a few pages in the Book of Genesis to encompass much of the twelve 
books of Milton’s epic poem. As Rachel Trubowitz states, “free will [is] the core 
principle of the poet’s ethics and politics” (388), and Milton’s selection of events from 
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the Bible, the original story as well as the alterations he made to the original story, serve 
to emphasize what he saw as the spiritual theme of personal liberty, self-determination, or 
what will henceforth be referred to most often as free will. This theme of free will 
permeates Milton’s epic because his interpretations of scripture, the panorama of history, 
and the goodness of God are all dependent upon it. Milton places the idea of humanity 
being possessed of free will at the center of his epic and as the very core principle built 
by God into human nature: 
I formd them free, and free they must remain, 
Till they enthrall themselves: I else must change  
Thir nature, and revoke the high Decree 
Unchangeable, Eternal, which ordain’d 
Thir freedom. (3.124-8) 
Paradise Lost presents the argument that mankind is created as free—formed and 
ordained as such by God—an eternal, unchangeable part of the nature of mankind. It is 
the quality of freedom that gives meaning to any action or sentiment such as obedience, 
worship, or love.  The separation scene between Adam and Eve which takes place in 
Book 9 of Paradise Lost is the most significant alteration that Milton makes to the 
original Biblical story. In the book of Genesis Adam and Eve are together when tempted 
by Satan with the fruit (Gen. 3:5-6), whereas in Paradise Lost, Milton has altered the 
circumstances of the temptation by separating the pair and having Eve alone be directly 
tempted by Satan, and Adam in turn tempted by Eve. By doing so, Milton is able to hold 
Adam and Eve individually responsible for their actions and to challenge the increasingly 
popular notion of predestination that had permeated the theology of much of Protestant 
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Christianity of his day. The separation scene in Paradise Lost is best understood as 
illustrative of Milton’s commitment to the concept of free will, a concept that he believed 
pervades all of human life from cradle to grave, and holds a place of importance in all of 
humanity’s relations.  
The separation scene also affords Milton the opportunity to explore more fully 
Adam and Eve’s individual culpability for the fall, and to examine the customary 
accusations of uxoriousness and vanity that the blurred lines of their responsibility have 
engendered over the years. Milton’s thought about free will as it pertains to Eve in 
particular and women in general is seemingly conflicted, and despite his apparent 
attempts to do so, he never quite resolved the implications that Eve’s free will would 
have upon the subordinate stature of women, and the degree to which they were 
permitted to make use of the free will that they were supposedly entitled to as part of 
God’s creation of humanity. Milton had a relatively enlightened attitude regarding the 
treatment of women compared to the general tenor of his time, but, despite having 
approached an ideal of equality, he was not able to shed the prevailing zeitgeist and fully 
embrace a reappraisal of womankind’s place in the world, choosing instead to maintain 
the masculine hegemony which was endorsed by his religion and culture.  
 
Milton’s God    
The invocation to Paradise Lost declares Milton’s primary purpose to be 
theodicy: to “assert Eternal Providence, /And justifie the wayes of God to men” (1.25-6). 
The ways of God with regard to His treatment of humanity differ from the prelapsarian 
world to the postlapsarian. In the prelapsarian world of Milton’s epic, the “wayes of God” 
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are fairly uncomplicated and can be reduced to His desire to be worshiped freely and 
unreservedly by humanity, out of love rather than any compulsion or reason: 
Our voluntarie service he requires, 
Not our necessitated, such with him  
Finds no acceptance, nor can find, for how 
Can hearts, not free, be tri’d whether they serve 
Willing or no, who will but what they must 
By Destinie, and can no other choose? (5.529-34) 
It is the voluntary quality of service that is precious to Milton’s God, who therefore 
invests humanity with the quality of free will so that any worship offered to Him can be 
unquestionably free of compulsion or ratiocination—so that, just as “Heav’ns free Love” 
(4.68) is extended to humanity, any love humanity might extend to God in return is free 
love, not compulsory. The quality of voluntariness is intimately involved with the 
concept of free will, and plays a large role in Milton’s view of the world. Hearts not free 
can be neither credited nor blamed for their actions because, good or bad, not free, their 
actions are not their own.  
 Paradise Lost first introduces the idea of freedom of the will and its particular 
importance in hell which is populated with those who were the first to exercise it to their 
own detriment and thereby lose their share of paradise. According to Satan, free will was 
the second creation of God: “Mee though just right, and the fixt Laws of Heav’n/ Did 
first create your Leader, next free choice” (2.18-9). And while it is true that, as Peter 
Lindenbaum states, “Satan is hardly a figure whose words or opinions we can accept 
without careful examination” (283), it seems that this particular statement of Satan’s, if it 
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does not depict the order of God’s creation accurately, may nonetheless reflect Milton’s 
creative process as Satan and free will are among the most important subjects in his 
poem. Free will is mentioned a second time in Hell when its demonic denizens await the 
return of Satan from his initial journey to Eden; while waiting, the fallen angels loll about 
their residence and cogitate upon their Creator, the mixed blessing of the free will that He 
has provided to them, and His foreknowledge of their fate. They know not what to make 
of it:  
Others apart sat on a Hill retir’d, 
In thoughts more elevate, and reason’d high 
Of Providence, Foreknowledge, Will and Fate, 
Fixt Fate, free will, foreknowledg absolute,  
And found no end, in wandring mazes lost. (2.557-61) 
The fallen Angels were neither the last to be baffled by the gift of free will nor the last to 
be ensnared in the trap of responsibility that it carries with it. The gift of free will is not 
easily understood and did not always turn out well for those so-gifted, and, while Satan’s 
reliability as a source of information about what transpired in heaven is open to question, 
it is significant that Milton has the first mention of the subject of free will broached by 
Satan, when he speaks of “the unconquerable will” (1.106), as it was a subject that had 
been bedeviling the ease of the religious for some time. God’s naming of “the high 
Decree / Unchangeable, Eternal, which ordain’d / Thir freedom” (3.126-8) tends to afford 
some support for Satan’s pronouncement about the birth date of that decree as well, as 
Milton likely would not have used the word “Eternal” casually. Satan’s free and 
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“unconquerable will” was eternal and among “the fixt Laws of Heav’n” even though his 
status among God’s favorites was not. 
 The significance of these mentions of free will from hell may rest in the warning 
that they provide that even though free will is an important component of the nature of 
rational beings, it is free of neither responsibility nor consequence. The fate of Satan and 
the other fallen angels serves as a cautionary tale that free will is not to be taken lightly. 
Free will does afford the opportunity to act contrary to God’s behests, but does not 
relieve the responsibility to behave obediently or, as Satan discovered to his eternal 
dismay, the dire consequences of the choice to disobey. In a rational world, only those 
who are free can be held responsible for their actions, because only the free could have 
acted differently than they did. This distinction is perhaps the most crucial to the 
understanding of Milton’s view of the loss of paradise. To iterate his position fully, he 
has Abdiel chastise Satan for confounding obedience with servitude:  
Unjustly thou deprav’st it with the name 
Of Servitude to serve whom God ordains, 
Or Nature; God and Nature bid the same, 
When he who rules is worthiest, and excels 
Them whom he governs. This is servitude, 
To serve th’ unwise, or him who hath rebelld 
Against his worthier, as thine now serve thee,  
Thy self not free, but to thy self enthrall’d.   
 Yet leudly dar'st our ministring upbraid. 
 Reign thou in Hell thy Kingdom, let mee serve 
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 In Heav'n God ever blest, and his Divine 
 Behests obey, worthiest to be obey'd. (6.174-85) 
Abdiel points out Satan’s error in mistaking obedience for servitude. He maintains that it 
is natural to follow those who are worthy of being followed, and it is unnatural to follow 
those who are unworthy. According to Abdiel, obedience is the natural state when the 
worthy, such as God or His Son, lead. Only when the unworthy such as Satan lead does 
obedience become servitude. Abdiel is happy to obey God because God is worthy to be 
obeyed. Unlike servitude, obedience is a natural and happy state, and an exercise of the 
free will, chosen freely by those who wish to obey. But when Abdiel points out that to 
obey who or what is worthy of obedience is to act in accord with God and nature, 
Milton’s reasoning leads to paradoxical conclusions, raising questions regarding the 
status of women in general, and Eve in particular. 
 God’s gift of Eve to Adam renders her status as a self-determined individual open 
to question. Her own free will cannot be considered unfettered if she belongs to Adam. 
God expects that Eve will obey Adam willingly because of his worthiness to be obeyed, 
an expectation that saddles Eve with a qualification to her putative free will which can 
hardly be called free when burdened with such expectations. God also further 
complicates Eve’s situation when He impugns Adam’s worthiness to be obeyed, when 
after the fall he asks Adam:  
Was shee thy God, that her thou didst obey  
Before his voice, or was shee made thy guide, 
Superior, or but equal, that to her 
Thou did'st resigne thy Manhood, and the Place 
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Wherein God set thee above her made of thee, 
And for thee, whose perfection farr excell'd  
Hers in all real dignitie: Adornd 
She was indeed, and lovely to attract 
Thy Love, not thy Subjection, and her Gifts 
Were such as under Government well seem'd, 
Unseemly to beare rule, which was thy part 
And person, hadst thou known thy self aright.  (10.145-56) 
God takes a perplexing position here. He has disparaged Adam and cast aspersions 
toward Eve. He questions Adam’s ability to lead as well as Eve ability to be led. He has 
set Adam above Eve, but then denigrates the validity of that position. He expects Eve to 
obey him who is worthy to be obeyed, but then questions that worthiness. His own 
definition of humanity includes self- determination—“Authors to themselves in all / Both 
what they judge and what they choose” (3.122-3), but Eve, created for Adam, adorned to 
attract him, far excelled by him in dignity, and in need of government, can hardly be said 
to be free if she must brook all these restraints, and can hardly be said to be human if she 
lacks the free will to refuse the bridle. Damned if she follows Adam and damned if she 
does not, thus rendering God’s own pronouncements about what constitutes a human 
moot, rather than “eternal” and “unchangeable.” 
 
 
Obedience & Free Will 
 
Before the fruit of the tree of knowledge had imbued Adam and Eve with the 
ability to distinguish between right and wrong, Milton’s God placed obedience in the 
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preeminent position among virtues and disobedience among sins: “Wouldst thou approve 
thy constancy, approve / First thy obedience” (9.367-8). God asked only obedience of His 
human creations, nothing more. 
Before He put Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden He put the tree there, the tree whose 
fruit bore the distinction between good and evil, right and wrong, and He forbade them 
nothing but the tree:  
God hath pronounc't it death to taste that Tree, 
The only sign of our obedience left 
Among so many signes of power and rule 
Conferrd upon us, and Dominion giv'n (4.427-30 ) 
The tree was the sole signifier of their obedience. Milton thought that obedience was so 
important to prelapsarian God that the first sentence of the argument to the first Book of 
Paradise Lost refers to “the whole Subject, Mans disobedience.” Obedience is thereby 
shown to be more important than right and wrong, which was a subject that Adam and 
Eve were forbidden to pursue by virtue of the proscription of the tree of knowledge. The 
only rule presented to the pair in Eden is to refrain from eating the fruit of that tree, so 
eating the fruit is the only opportunity that Adam and Eve are provided with to 
transgress: “God so commanded, and left that Command / Sole Daughter of his voice; the 
rest, we live / Law to our selves, our Reason is our Law” (9.652-4). God wants their 
obedience because it is the outward sign of their love; it is the sign that the love they hold 
for God and that God holds for them in return matters more to them than anything else.  
Obedience is the sign – nay the guarantor – of the voluntary nature of their 
service, that hearts free to do otherwise obey anyhow—not due to reason or rationale, but 
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as a function of unreserved love: “freely we serve / Because we freely love” (5.537-8). 
Those who have fallen—formerly angels, now demons—have fallen due to disobedience 
– “And Som are fall’n, to disobedience fall’n” (5.540) – no other cause is mentioned nor 
reason given because there is no other reason, nor need for any. Barbara Lewalski agrees, 
maintaining that “Milton treats the conditions of prelapsarian human life [in De Doctrina] 
in terms directly relevant to his epic. He asserts that Adam and Eve were bound only by 
the natural moral law and a single positive law, the divine prohibition against eating the 
Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil” (429). The only direct prelapsarian prohibition is 
the tree of knowledge; their only opportunity to sin is in eating the prohibited fruit, 
because that is the only restriction, “Sole Daughter of his voice,” they have been given 
that can be disobeyed. It is not the fruit that is important but the prohibition. It is God’s 
method of determining that the obedience to His directive is as important to Adam and 
Eve as it is to Him. 
Disobedience is repugnant to Milton’s God because it shows a fundamental 
mistrust of God; it demonstrates a lack of trust that God knows how to best serve man’s 
interests or perhaps that He even knows what those interests are. Disobedience thus 
becomes a compounded sin: it is blasphemy, faithlessness, arrogance, even perhaps greed 
and lust, all rolled into one. Stanley Fish postulates that “at some level of generality, all 
values are one” (336), and he catalogues the virtues of obedience: “Heroism is obedience: 
an entire book is devoted to that equation . . . Knowledge is obedience . . . Wisdom is 
obedience. Paradoxically, freedom (liberty) is obedience because true freedom is the 
freedom to follow the best, while freedom from God is servitude” (332). Obedience is all 
virtues rolled into one, but without freedom of choice, obedience is compulsion, and 
Kimball 14 
 
compulsion is the responsibility of the compeller not the compelled, so compulsory 
virtues are not virtues at all. Fish further postulates that “the decision of an absolutely 
free will cannot be determined by forces outside it” (346), so the decision to be obedient 
must be freely made in order to be commendatory; obedience without free will is 
meaningless, because obedience without the opportunity to disobey is mere coincidence.  
The knowledge of the difference between good and evil contained in the fruit of 
the tree of knowledge is the seed of the fall of man. Satan wondered why this knowledge 
should be forbidden to Adam and Eve: “do they onely stand / By Ignorance, is that thir 
happie state, / The proof of thir obedience and thir faith?” (4.518-20). The answer to 
Satan’s question is of course ‘yes;’ they do stand only by ignorance. Ignorance is the 
proof of their obedience and their faith. Adam and Eve’s blissful state of ignorance is 
their protection against disobedience which is wrought of too much questioning, too 
much ratiocination. The “adoration pure / Which God likes best” (4.737-8) is not wrought 
of rational materials. It is the stuff of unadulterated love, and is corrupted by too much 
rationale. To Milton’s God, the show of obedience is more precious than any 
demonstration of mental acuity that his creations might display. Obedience is a show of 
unquestioning trust and love. Once a choice is governed by reason, then it loses its 
quality of obedience because it becomes a matter of self-interest. Possession of the 
knowledge of the distinction between good and evil changes the motivation for the choice 
and thus undermines the choice being made as a function of obedience—as God would 
wish it to be—and means that obedience has become the slave of reason rather than the 
harbinger of love. God wants his creations to choose to obey him out of love, simply 
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because that is what He has asked of them and that is what would please Him best, rather 
than because it suits them to do so. He wants His creations to want to please Him.  
God’s prohibition of the tree of knowledge as a source of food is based not on the 
importance of the fruit of that tree, or even the importance of the knowledge of good and 
evil, but on the need for there to be some form of prohibition so that the obedience that 
Adam and Eve paid to God would be demonstrably voluntary. Adam endeavors to 
explain the concept to Eve that any harm that can come to them will be a result of willful 
disobedience: “within himself / The danger lies, yet lies within his power: / Against his 
will he can receave no harme” (9.348-50). In Milton’s prelapsarian Eden, to be safe from 
harm, mankind must only be obedient. As long as they choose to abide by the sole 
prohibition that God has made, they can do no wrong. Conversely, if there were nothing 
prohibited, they would be unable to do wrong; hence their doing right would be 
preordained and consequently neither meritorious nor meaningful. Thus God created free 
will and the prohibition as complementary components; there is no purpose to one 
without the other. For both Milton and his God, it is the ability to choose otherwise that 
gives meaning to choice, and it is the opportunity to make choices that is the necessary 
component to the establishment of free will. Being aware of the distinction between good 
and evil changes the fundamental quality of the motivation behind any choice or decision 
that is made thereafter. A choice made to obey before this knowledge appertains is a 
choice to trust in the providence of God, which is what God “loves best,” whereas a 
choice made with the knowledge of good and evil changes the tenor of that decision to a 
form of enlightened self-interest which can no longer be considered “adoration pure.” 
Nor can a choice governed solely by reason be trusted to be a right choice: “Since Reason 
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not impossibly may meet / Some specious object by the Foe subornd, / And fall into 
deception unaware,” (9.360-2). Reason is subject to corruption and deception, but 
obedience is not. So for Milton the distinction between prelapsarian choice and 
postlapsarian is that for humanity prelapsarian choice is best left without recourse to 
reason or the knowledge of good and evil; postlapsarian choices are made with the help 
of reason and the knowledge of good and evil, which is intended to be a kind of helpmeet 
to the fallen mind, which needed no such help before the fall. Prelapsarian choice was 
between obedience and disobedience; postlapsarian choice is between right and wrong.2 
God forbade the fruit of the tree of knowledge because the knowledge of the distinction 
between good and evil will not be helpful to mankind in the prelapsarian decision-making 
process. Despite mankind’s considerable rational abilities, the issue of right and wrong 
will only serve to cloud his judgment. 
 For the unfallen Adam and Eve, the choice may seem as if it is the choice 
between good and evil, but in paradise the wise use of choice is not between good and 
evil but between obedience and disobedience. Milton’s position seems to be that—at least 
in the unfallen state—it behooves mankind to value obedience more highly than 
rationality because it is what God values most highly. The inadequacy of using reason to 
make decisions about obedience to God is spelled out more fully in Areopagitica, where 
Milton states that:  
                                                
2 It should be acknowledged that it was not until after they had partaken of the fruit – after the fall – that 
Adam and Eve had the knowledge of the difference between good and evil, so that knowledge could not 
therefore have played any part in their decision to eat the fruit. They use reason presumably to arrive at 
their decisions to eat, and used it differently from one another, Eve seeking Godhead (“nor was God-head 
from her thought” (9.790)) or equality with Adam (“the more to draw his Love, / And render me more 
equal, and perhaps, / A thing not undesireable, somtime / Superior” (9.822-5)) and Adam, afraid of being 
deprived of Eve, seeking to seal their joint fate (And mee with thee hath ruind, for with thee / Certain my 




Good and evill we know in the field of this World grow up together almost 
inseparably; and the knowledge of good is so involv’d and interwoven 
with the knowledge of evill, and in so many cunning resemblances hardly 
to be discern’d, that those confused seeds which were impos’d on Psyche 
as an incessant labour to cull out, and sort asunder, were not more 
intermixt. It was from out the rinde of one apple tasted, that the knowledge 
of good and evill as two twins cleaving together leapt forth into the World. 
And perhaps this is that doom which Adam fell into of knowing good and 
evill, that is to say of knowing good by evill. As therefore the state of man 
now is; what wisdome can there be to choose, what continence to forbeare 
without the knowledge of evill? (1006) 
Milton takes the position in this passage that it is well-nigh impossible to make a correct 
choice rationally —“hardly to be discern’d” and “what wisdome can there be to choose” 
— and that it were better to merely be obedient. But Milton is here speaking of fallen 
humanity who must now resort to the dictates of reason as best they can— because in the 
fallen state, “Knowledge of Good [will be] bought dear by knowing ill” (4.222). Being 
fallen, it is too late to be simply obedient, so mankind, as he now is, must have recourse 
to the knowledge of the difference between good and evil/right and wrong to assist him in 
his decision making. Prelapsarian humanity however had the possibility of simple 
obedience without recourse to reason, and was thus better off. In the prelapsarian world, 
the use of rationality in the exercise of free will was more likely to cause harm than good. 
Preferring “adoration pure,” Milton’s God dismisses the vain and useless enterprise of the 
exercise of reason and its inadequacy as a guiding force for the will in the prelapsarian 
Kimball 18 
 
world: “What pleasure I from such obedience paid, / When Will and Reason (Reason also 
is choice) / Useless and vain, of freedom both despoild, / Made passive both, had servd 
necessitie, / Not mee” (3.107-11). The use of reason in their choice of action served 
neither mankind nor the angels well, resulting in misbegotten choices where selfish 
motives were preferred over simple obedience, causing the fall of both mankind and 
angel.  
Milton found the Calvinistic idea of predestination odious, and spent much of his 
later life debunking it on grounds both logical and practical. Although much of his 
writing touched upon the subject of predestination, Paradise Lost perhaps serves as the 
most trenchant example of his distaste for the concept. Throughout the epic poem, he 
avers that predestination can not be the way of the world and the world still be the work 
of a rational and benevolent God. The ability to reason is of little use and has small 
purpose if all outcomes are prearranged. Granted, it is difficult to explain how a God can 
be omniscient and still not know the future, but Milton works around this by 
expostulating that knowing the future and predetermining the future are not the same 
thing, and that free will and foreknowledge are not mutually exclusive: “if I foreknew, / 
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault, / Which had no less prov’d certain 
unforeknown” (3.117-9). Milton believes that there is a difference between what happens 
on its own and what God wills to happen, and it is in this gap that he builds his 
conception of free will. He also felt that time is subject to God’s will; that God created 
time, which is not eternal, and superimposed it over the preexisting cosmos, and thus He 
is not governed by the laws of time. If God’s omniscience predates the existence of time 
then God has known all things that would come to pass before they came to pass or even 
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before the principals had come into being, but he did not necessarily will whatever 
actions these principals may have performed. Thus knowing what would eventually 
happen did not necessarily mean that He caused it to happen or willed it to happen. God’s 
omniscience is not subject to the constraints that time imposes upon other of his creations 
 
Personal Protestantism 
Milton’s insistence on free will as an inherent part of human nature is a departure 
from the theology of the most prominent Protestant theologians of his epoch, and is 
indicative of Milton’s movement away from mainstream Protestantism, and toward a 
personal religion to which he could more confidently commit himself. From the time 
Martin Luther nailed his ninety-five theses to the door of the Castle Church of Wittenberg 
in 1517, the question of free will vs. predestination became one of the ongoing debates of 
the Protestant Reformation. Luther, the central figure of the Reformation who believed 
that free will was illusory, and Desiderius Erasmus, the famed Humanist and reform-
minded Catholic who believed that free will was a necessary part of the definition of 
mankind, famously debated the subject in their correspondence, beginning nearly a 
century prior to Milton’s birth. Georgia Christopher points out, “the difference between 
Catholic and Protestant traditions has often been located in the question of free will” 
(200), but as the devoted Protestant Milton’s support of the concept of free will 
demonstrates, this is not always the case. 
 Milton was not a doctrinaire Protestant. His form of personal Protestantism 
permitted him to reject those doctrines which he did not find suitable. This is where 
Milton drove his wedge between the principles of prescience and predetermination. He 
believed that omniscience and free will could peacefully coexist, a premise long-since 
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embraced by the Catholic Church, and thus increasingly likely to be declared anathema 
by the Protestants, and as a matter of personal conscience and his interpretation of 
scripture he came to believe in the existence of free will. James Turner comments that 
Milton had a “complex relation to contemporary Protestantism” (79), and perhaps the 
greatest complicating factor was Milton’s opinion of the matter of free will. A tendency 
toward biblical literalism led the adherents of many Protestant denominations such as 
Lutherans and Calvinists to believe that God’s omniscience presupposed predestination, 
which thereby precluded the possibility of self-determination. But unlike many of the 
Protestants in his day, Milton was not a biblical literalist, and as can be seen from “his 
attacks on literalistic biblical exegesis” (Lewalski 155), he did not believe that the Bible 
was the infallible word of God. According to Lewalski, “Milton could escape the 
constraints of biblical literalism in treating his subject because . . . he gave the indwelling 
spirit of God priority over the letter of scripture, insisting that the meaning of any 
scripture text must accord with the dictates of reason and the overarching precept of 
charity” (476).  The absence of biblical literalism distinguished Milton from many of the 
Protestants of his day, and his confidence in the rationality and beneficence of God led to 
the formation of his stance on free will. Diane McColley confirms Milton’s non-literalist 
position: “Milton believed that the Bible was true, but that the individual conscience 
guided by the Holy Spirit had a good deal of leeway in interpreting it, measured always 
by the rule of charity: trust in the goodness of God and commitment to the well-being of 
humankind” (“Milton and the Sexes” 151). To Milton, the truth of the Bible was not in 
the literal and legalistic interpretation of its words, but in the unerring sentiments that are 
expressed in those words. In Paradise Lost, Milton draws a “remarkable portrait of a 
Kimball 21 
 
rational God, so very different from the Calvinist arbitrary deity whose reasons and will 
are unfathomable” (Lewalski 170). To Milton, what is most important in the Bible is the 
rationality and beneficence of God that shine through the text of the Bible; he had little 
use for the biblical literalist’s habit of attempting to parse particular phrases for their 
potential use as a premise for a law, principle, or adage. It is this lack of biblical 
literalism and faith in the spirit of the Bible that makes it possible for Milton to expand 
upon and alter the original story without fear of offending his God. Milton’s theological 
inclinations permitted him to alter the details of the Biblical story because he believed 
that he was remaining true to the spirit of the text, and the spirit of the text is the source 
for his theodicy and the basis of his theology. 
Over the intervening centuries since the publication of Paradise Lost, Milton’s 
precise theology has proven notoriously difficult to pin down. In his introduction to 
Paradise Lost, C.S. Lewis wrote that “Milton’s thought, when purged of its theology, 
does not exist” (64), and one certainly cannot give a complete accounting of Paradise 
Lost without taking that theology into account. Milton’s theology was in more or less 
constant flux throughout his life, and by the time he finished Paradise Lost, did not 
coincide with the dogma of any established religious denomination. As a result of his 
personal and ever-evolving theology and his politics which were often of a somewhat 
radical bent, it behooved him at times to avoid confirming what others may have thought 
of him. He often disagreed with the mainstream Protestant beliefs of his contemporaries, 
and the use of what Thomas Fulton called “negative representation” (202), a kind of habit 
of obfuscation, likely spared him from constantly having to defend his often controversial 
beliefs. As he matured, he had come to reject the notion of predestination, in opposition 
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to the doctrines of Luther and Calvin. He also seemed, later in life, to have adopted the 
controversial Arian stance that the Son of God was subordinate to the Father, thus 
discounting the widely accepted Christian postulation of the “Holy Trinity.” Such a 
position would have doubtless been denounced as heretical in Milton’s time, and 
subjected him to vilification, which may well account for his apparent reluctance to 
embrace it publicly. 
As a younger man, some of Milton’s writings were somewhat radical compared to 
the commonplace views of others, and he was denounced almost routinely. Despite their 
basis in serious biblical exegesis and religious devotion, he “was widely accused of . . . 
[libertinism] . . . because of his divorce tracts” (Stapleton 85).  Milton was a man who 
highly valued freedom of thought and expression (as evidenced by Areopagitica), and 
despite being variously vilified throughout his life for one thing or another, he did not 
abandon his principles, being disinclined to allow any sect to dictate to him what 
constituted acceptable belief: 
Milton was continuously at battle with the mechanisms of prohibition 
which sought (often quite inconsistently) to define the limits of what was 
printable: in spite of a Licensing Order of 1643, for example, Milton 
refused to obtain a license to publish divorce tracts, and wrote a major 
polemic against licensing. Shortly thereafter, perhaps in part because the 
extremists included his views among the heresies that deserved 
persecution, Milton retreated from print culture to write several texts 
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including some that would remain in manuscript until after his death.3 
(Fulton 202) 
Perhaps wearied from public combat with regard to his writings, he may have withdrawn 
from the field of battle, but was loath to capitulate in his thinking. His reasoning in favor 
of the right to divorce, for instance, is based on thinking far removed from the libertinism 
he was accused of, and the calumny of his detractors in all likelihood drove him to retreat 
further from any formal religious affiliation into his own more personalized form of 
worship. Shawcross said of Milton, “though he seems to accept Presbyterianism for a 
while, he later rejects it; though he seems influenced by the Independents and their 
Arminian stance, he does not become a thorough Independent or Arminian” (31). He 
seems to be continually searching for answers that he can commit to both intellectually as 
well as spiritually, and those answers offered by these religious sects never seem to hold 
his attention or commitment for long, and his ongoing pursuit of answers to theological 
questions always seems to return to his own exegesis as the only kind he is willing to 
trust. Thus, by the time of his writing of Paradise Lost, he is no longer affiliated with any 
religious denomination, and seems satisfied to formulate his own form of religious 
observation without feeling a need to accommodate himself to the constraints of any 
denominational affiliation. Fulton confirms Milton’s lack of a formal religious affiliation: 
“famously, he seldom mentions sects by name, and after his explicit break with the 
Presbyterians in the mid-1640’s, he does not assign to himself any sectarian identity” 
(202). He was wont to pick and choose the principles in which he believed based upon 
how well they suited his thinking, and gave little consideration to how his beliefs were 
                                                
3 This might help to explain why De Doctrina Christiana was never published.  
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received by others; and by the time he wrote Paradise Lost, his most pronounced 
disagreement was on the subject of free will— with Presbyterians, Puritans, or anyone 
who might espouse the doctrine of predestination.  
Affiliating oneself with a particular sect tends to foster a fanaticism and certitude 
which would not have come naturally to the ever-evolving Milton, and would have forced 
him into at least some degree of capitulation to what other churchmen considered as 
established principles. Within these fast-forming Protestant sects of his day, the 
formation of codified ideologies and a tendency toward ossification of their tenets of 
belief would sometimes lead to hasty accusations of deviant or heretical beliefs, an 
unpleasant circumstance which he had already experienced and was doubtless in no hurry 
to repeat. Milton’s form of personal religion was based in what Maria Magro refers to as 
the “Protestant belief in the predominance of the individual conscience in matters of 
spiritual welfare over any state or ecclesiastical coercion, and the Protestant emphasis on 
interpreting scripture for oneself” (103), and to align himself with any denomination 
would have tended to undermine Milton’s reliance on the individual conscience and 
personal scriptural interpretation. Evidently unconvinced by Protestant theologians that 
predestination is an unassailable conclusion to be drawn from sound scriptural exegesis, 
Milton attempts in Paradise Lost to impugn the concept of predestination by portraying 
free will as a gift from a beneficent God, included in the very conception of the nature of 
humanity. He endeavors to show that humanity’s love for God must necessarily be 
voluntary for it to be genuine and meaningful, “for how / Can hearts, not free, be tri’d 
whether they serve / Willing or no?” The essence of voluntariness is free will. To Milton, 
God’s justice is likewise dependent upon free will. Paradise Lost depicts a beneficent 
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God (“That thou art happie, owe to God” (5.520)), who is just (Not just, not God” 
(9.701)), and not arbitrary. In order that the reward and punishment doled out by God be 
just and not arbitrary, it must be merited, deserved by the individual, and commensurate 
with the acts involved. Therefore, the actions to be rewarded or punished must be 
voluntary because it would be unjust to reward or punish behavior undeservedly. Stanley 
Fish points out that “by punishing man, God accords him the respect due a free agent, and 
is therefore just” (255).  The justice flows from mankind’s status as free agent, which is 
God’s way of showing respect for humanity. God will allow mankind to earn his destiny 
rather than predestine him, and in turn, the love that mankind accords to God will be the 
voluntary love that He craves, for love “necessitated, such with him / Finds no 
acceptance, nor can find” (5.530-1). This voluntary love is what Milton sees at the heart 
of the relationship between God and humankind, and the subsequent mutual respect and 
just desert are a function of the free agency that God has granted to mankind and cannot 
exist without it. 
While Milton’s epic poem certainly promotes the centrality of free will, Milton 
seems to have been little interested in using Paradise Lost to respond directly or 
specifically to Luther or Calvin, preferring to address the concept of predestination itself 
rather than any of its particular proponents. Christopher writes that Milton “usually he did 
not speak of the Reformation” (her emphasis) and “did not consider Luther’s break with 
Rome to be the important watershed in western history it is now regarded . . . . [and] saw 
the work of reformation as a recurring task” (197). To Milton, reformation was not just a 
one-time reordering of priorities, but an ongoing responsibility of the faithful, involving a 
lifetime of contemplation and vigilance. Milton himself lived this lifelong reformation, 
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continuing to evolve and adapt his religious beliefs throughout his lifetime as his 
conscience and contemplation called for it. He had been “at least nominally a 
predestinarian Calvinist” (Lewalski 122), but he did not swallow whole the Calvinist 
doctrine served to him from the pulpit, but chose rather to ruminate the theological cud4 
as “he departs from the usual Calvinist insistence on God’s control of individual lives 
[and] history” (Lewalski 122). He continued to consider his beliefs critically throughout 
his life while attempting to account for their ramifications and implications and how they 
fit into his understanding of his life and his God, and eventually concludes that the 
principle of predestination does not fit his understanding.  
As a result of this adjustment in his thinking, Paradise Lost is somewhat 
dismissive of the arguments against free will. Milton has God repeatedly assert that free 
will is an inherent part of the nature of rational beings, included at their creation; twice 
during his discourse with the Son in book 3: “Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall. 
/ Such I created all th’ Ethereal Powers” (3.99-100). And again several lines later: 
I formd them free, and free they must remain, 
Till they enthrall themselves: I else must change  
Thir nature, and revoke the high Decree 
Unchangeable, Eternal, which ordain’d 
Thir freedom, they themselves ordain’d thir fall. (3.124-8) 
And then in Book 5: “And good he made thee, but to persevere / He left it in thy power, 
ordaind thy will / By nature free, not over-rul’d by Fate” (5.525-7). Milton sees free will 
as an essential part of human nature, as well as the nature of his other rational creations, 
Angels. The free will that these rational creations possess serves to exonerate God from 
                                                
4 Alimentary metaphors with thanks to Minaz Jooma. 
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the responsibility for their actions, and puts the onus on the rational creatures themselves. 
But they are therefore required to make their own decisions, and are thus capable of 
deciding incorrectly or contrary to God’s wishes (though not his will). Humans can and 
will enthrall themselves, as did some of the Angels, and it will be their own fault, and 
they will have consequences to face, and yet as a result of facing those consequences, 
will still have a possibility of redemption.  
Because time is His own creation, the future and the past do not restrict Milton’s 
God in the way that they do humanity. He is able to see what will occur in the future just 
as He can see what has happened in the past, without necessarily having willed these 
things to have happened. This separation of events into two kinds, those which God has 
willed to occur and those that have occurred without His having willed them, is similar to 
Milton’s separation of sin into two component parts: “Each type of sin . . . has two 
subdivisions . . . . the will to do evil, and the evil deed itself” (On Christian Doctrine 
1191). In addition to the event itself, destiny must, in addition to the actual occurrence of 
an event, include God’s will that an event occur for that event to be considered destined. 
God is only responsible for the events that he specifically wills to happen5: “if I 
foreknew, / Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault, / Which had no less prov’d 
certain unforeknown.”  This is how free will and prescience can for Milton live side by 
side. Milton’s God presents mankind with the choices, but does not make the choices for 
him. This is the point where Milton addresses the “predestinarians” most directly, 
drawing the distinction between knowledge and destiny (prescience and predestination). 
He maintains that God is able to separate what He knows from what He wills, and that 
                                                
5 So perhaps there is no special providence in the fall of a sparrow, at least not every sparrow. 
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only what He wills is destiny. Not everything that happens is willed by God to happen; 
some things He merely permits to happen.  
 
Arianism   
Milton’s personalized religion and lack of denominational affiliation did not shield him 
from periodic vilification. He was accused of heresy while living (Fulton 32) as well as 
after his death. The particular heresy of which he has been accused and perhaps the most 
controversial aspect of Milton’s personal theology as it pertains to Paradise Lost is that 
of Arianism. Arianism is an ancient theological position which was adjudged a heresy by 
the Catholic Church a few hundred years after the death of Christ, and mainstream 
Protestant Churches did not counter that judgment. The accusation of heresy against 
Milton was founded in his apparent acceptance of the Arian precept that the Son of God 
was subordinate to God. Milton stated in Tetrachordon, published in 1645, “God is the 
head of Christ” (1030). This precept ran counter to mainstream Christianity’s traditional 
and widely accepted conception of the “Holy Trinity” which postulated a divine 
triumvirate of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost who were all immortal, eternal, 
and of essentially equal status. Although, a few years later, in Eikonoklastes, published in 
1649, Milton called Arianism a heresy referring to the “Arian and Pelagian heresies” 
(1089); thus exhibiting the protean quality to his theology that would remain to some 
degree for the rest of his lifetime. As a more mature man, perhaps as a result of “a 
development in Milton’s thought” (Lewalski 170), he seems to have more fully embraced 
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the Arian subordination of the Son to the Father, at least where Paradise Lost was 
concerned.6  
The justification of the ways of God is the stated mission of Paradise Lost, and a 
rational God is more easily justified than an arbitrary deity, not just from a theological 
standpoint, but from an artistic standpoint as well. Any creation myth needs to maintain a 
degree of plausibility to gain acceptance from its intended audience. As a creation myth, 
the story of Paradise Lost needs to make sense, to be rational, because the God that 
Milton wished to portray was rational. Arianism’s demotion of the Son from equal with 
God to subordinate status is based in the reasoning that the Son of God was created by 
God the Father and consequently after the Father, and therefore would not exist if not for 
that act of creation by God; the Son has existed for something less than eternity because 
there was a time when God existed, but that His Son did not. The accusation of Arianism 
against Milton’s Paradise Lost stems primarily from his attempt to establish that the Son 
volunteered of His own free will to expiate the sins of humanity. Milton wished to 
emphasize the heroic character of the Son, and according to Lewalski, “Milton’s 
Arianism allows him to portray the Son as a genuinely dramatic and heroic character, 
whose choices are made and whose actions are taken freely, in a state of imperfect 
knowledge” (473). It is precisely the voluntary nature of these actions that imbues them 
with their heroic character. If the Son were not an entity separate from God, His act of 
volunteerism would have been an empty solipsistic gesture. It is the presence of free will 
and the absence of predestination that makes this volunteerism, and thus the heroism, 
                                                
6 There is also some considerable indication of Arianism in De Doctrina Christiana, but given the 
controversy of its authorship, it will not be addressed here. 
Kimball 30 
 
possible, otherwise it is merely all a part of a preordained, fated plan, and fate does not 
create heroes; choice does. 
The voluntary nature of the Son’s sacrifice is emphasized in several passages of 
Paradise Lost which Milton uses to paint the portrait of the Son’s heroism that is so 
important to the poem. In turn, these passages reflect the sentiments found in Raphael’s 
pronouncement to Adam about the importance to God of the voluntary nature of an act 
and the favor that it finds with Him, and conversely the emptiness of any service 
governed by destiny and not choice:  
Our voluntarie service he requires, 
Not our necessitated, such with him  
Finds no acceptance, nor can find, for how 
Can hearts, not free, be tri’d whether they serve 
Willing or no, who will but what they must 
By Destinie, and can no other choose? (5.529-34) 
The voluntary nature of the Son’s actions  in turn reflect the Arian precepts that Milton 
has adopted for his poem because the voluntariness presupposes that he be an entity 
separate from the Father—born after the Father, created by the Father and subordinate to 
the Father.  
The importance of the Son’s heroism to the poem is echoed in the importance to 
the Father of the voluntariness of the Son’s actions. Milton repeatedly uses the word 
“freely” in describing the Son’s actions, which in turn seem designed to curry favor with 
the Father. The Book 3 Argument overtly states that “The Son of God freely offers himself 
a Ransome for Man” (415) (Milton’s italics), a phrase which seems to orbit around the 
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word “freely”; the Son reinforces that voluntary element in the rhetoric of his offer to the 
Father, and again uses the word “freely”:  
Behold mee then, mee for him, life for life 
I offer, on mee let thine anger fall; 
Account mee man; I for his sake will leave 
Thy bosom, and this glorie next to thee 
Freely put off, and for him lastly dye  
Well pleas’d, on me let Death wreck all his rage. (3. 236-41) 
Like the previous passage, this one also serves to emphasize the heroic and voluntary 
qualities of the son, but the separateness of the Son and the Son’s subordination are 
manifested in the beseeching tone of the Son toward the Father, and in Milton’s use of 
some particular language that emphasizes the nature of the Son as discrete from and 
subordinate to the Father. The separateness of the Son from the Father is established most 
overtly in the phrases: “on mee let thine anger fall” and “leave thy bosom,” while the 
heroic quality of the Son and his voluntary sacrifice for humanity are established in the 
phrases: “for his sake,” “and for him,” and “Freely put off.” The willingness of the Son to 
face death voluntarily and to freely put off the glory of residing in the presence of the 
Father for the sake of the redemption of mankind’s sin can not be portrayed as heroic 
without the aspect of voluntariness, which can not exist without the Son’s being self-
determined. An individual commanded to take on a suicide mission against his will has 
not the heroic tenor of the one who volunteers to do so.  
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The Arian precept of the Son’s subordination is also addressed pointedly in the 
following passage in which God speaks to the son’s discrete creation as separate from, 
later than, and by the leave of the Father: 
This day I have begot whom I declare 
My onely Son, and on this holy Hill 
Him have anointed, whom ye now behold  
At my right hand; your Head I him appoint; 
And by my Self have sworn to him shall bow 
All knees in Heav’n, and shall confess him Lord. (5.603-8) 
This passage indicates the subordination of the Son in that the Father has begot (to bring 
into existence), anointed, and appointed Him, and also, in a somewhat backhanded 
fashion, in that the Father’s pronouncement of the Son as “your Head” implies that it is 
the Father’s prerogative to determine the limits of the Son’s power.  
Later, Milton further stresses the “voluntarie” aspect of the Son’s redemption of 
humanity’s sin as an important part of God’s intent: 
I intend 
Mercie collegue with Justice, sending thee 
Mans Friend his Mediator, his design’d  
Both Ransom and Redeemer voluntarie, 
And destin’d Man himself to judge Man fall’n.  (10.58-62) 
God here discusses that the Son was “design’d” as ransom and redeemer. The act of 
design requires that the designer be an entity separate from and exist before the designed. 
However, despite the inclusion of the word “voluntarie,” Milton does somewhat confuse 
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the issue of free will when speaking of the Son’s upcoming judgment of Adam and Eve, 
with his use of the word “destin’d” which might tend to impugn the assertion of the free 
will of the Son as, if he is “destin’d” to be Man and to judge Man, his “voluntarie 
service” seems less voluntary. It may be, however, that the temptation to juxtapose 
“design’d” and “destin’d” was too great for Milton to resist, and presumably as long as 
the verdict to be delivered by the Son is not predetermined then the charge of 
predestination may be averted. This passage also serves to reinforce the beneficence and 
rationality of God in that His intent is to have “Mercie collegue with Justice” in the 
judgment upon “Man.” This brief passage also displays Milton’s remarkable economy 
with words as there are nearly as many disparate ideas contained in this short passage as 
there are words. The Son’s response to His Father also has implications of subordination 
when He says: “Father Eternal, thine is to decree, / Mine both in Heav’n and Earth to do 
thy will” (10.68-9). These passages all support the notion that Arianism played a 
substantial part in Paradise Lost by illustrating the separateness and subordination of the 
Father and the Son. They serve a purpose in aiding Milton to draw the picture of free will 
as a part of human nature and paint the portrait of a heroic act on the part of the Son, thus 
helping to establish Him as the epic hero of Paradise Lost.  
Perhaps the best argument in support of Milton’s use of the principles of Arianism 
in Paradise Lost is that it helps him to make sense of his creation story while also 
providing him with a way to establish his God as a rational one. Arianism contributes 
mightily to Milton’s mission of theodicy in Paradise Lost, helping him to demonstrate 
the rational and beneficent God in which he believed. Labriola, addressing this topic, 
refers to it as: 
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a recurrent theme in Milton’s major poems: the justification of God’s 
ways to humankind. In Paradise Lost for example, the downfall of Adam 
and Eve and the introduction of sin and death into the human condition are 
interpreted from a providential perspective. From this vantage point, the 
deity is not vengeful but merciful, not misguided or blind but instrumental 
in humankind’s ultimate triumph. (171)   
For Milton to justify the ways of God, he must show that God’s ways are just, that He 
acts rationally, mercifully, and lovingly. The introduction of the Arian precept of a 
subordinate Son of God provides Milton with a coherent way to do so, so that the actions 
of that God follow a rational progression and are not subject to arbitrary whims and 
incomprehensible episodes. The adoption of the principle of God’s creation of the Son 
coming after His own creation enables Milton to justify the ways of God more 
satisfactorily to himself, and as an artist he would be hard-pressed to convince his readers 
to accept that which he does not himself believe.  
Milton’s first principle is his definition of God. Biblical literalists who use the 
words of the Bible to extrapolate a definition of God and God’s ways have as their first 
principle the Bible, “the word of God,” and they judge that if God said so and so in his 
book, which we deem to be his word, and therefore infallible, it can be extrapolated from 
this premise that certain other conclusions may be drawn. Their reasoning is syllogistic: 
If God is omniscient, He knows everything that will happen in the future; if everything 
that will happen in the future is known by God in advance, everything is predestined. But 
Milton’s first principle is a definition of God—a God “not vengeful but merciful, not 
misguided or blind but instrumental in humankind’s ultimate triumph”— not an 
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acceptance of the Bible as the unimpeachable word of God. Milton’s God in Paradise 
Lost is merciful, beneficent, rational, and just. Free will is a conclusion that Milton has 
arrived at from the implications of these premises, not the premise upon which his 
conclusions are based. The status of the Son as subordinate to the Father is another 
conclusion based upon these premises.  
Milton’s God is not the God of Calvin, and He is not a God who is defined 
through literalist biblical exegesis. What is most important to Milton is not that the 
schema arrived at from extrapolation of biblical principles be found to be logically sound, 
but that the biblical principles be found to support the goodness of God. For Milton, the 
story that he wished to tell of mankind’s sin and redemption required that mankind have 
free agency in order to justify God’s treatment of humankind as deserving of his fate and 
worthy of his redemption, and the story of the heroism of the Son’s sacrifice for 
humankind required that the Son be acting out of free will when He volunteers Himself 
for the redemption of humanity. In order for that gesture to have meaning, that it be 
heroic, it is imperative that the Son not be predestined to His role, but rather that He take 
it on as an example of His great love for God and humanity.  
 
Miltonic Marriage 
Milton’s ideal of marriage is based on the marriage of Adam and Eve, formed 
throughout a lifetime of Biblical exegesis and contemplation, and informed by his 
lifelong fascination with Eve. According to Lewalski, Milton “spent his youth ‘chastly’ 
expecting to find in marriage his ‘chiefest earthly comforts’ and especially relief from 
‘unkindly solitarines’” (165) and “fantasizing about how wonderful marriage will be 
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when it happens for him, using the marriage of Adam and Eve as his fantasy model” 
(166). Milton’s youthful expectations were not fulfilled as he had hoped by his first 
marriage; his wife returned to her father shortly after the nuptials, and he consequently 
undertook a justification for divorce, but he did not abandon his idealistic view of 
marriage and its possibilities for delivering the ‘chiefest earthly comforts.’ Because their 
alliance was formed in the prelapsarian world, Milton believed “that there was a neerer 
alliance between Adam and Eve, then could be ever after between man and wife” 
(Tetrachordon 1035), but their marriage could still serve as an ideal for the rest of 
humanity as it did for him.  
In extolling marriage, Milton speaks most often and most highly of the 
importance of “converse” and companionship as the most important components of any 
marriage, but there are other elements involved in a marriage that Milton found 
indispensible to its success. He felt that sexual relations were an integral part of marriage, 
but not the most important part. In Paradise Lost, the marriage of Adam and Eve 
included sex as an urgent element, consummated forthwith after their first meeting and 
abrupt marriage ceremony. According to McColley, Milton considered sex to be “a 
divine gift” (“Sexes”150). Although sex was an important part of Milton’s conception of 
marriage, he believed that “mariage is not a meer carnall coition, but a human Society” 
(948).  His extensive writings in advocacy for the right to divorce were not based in any 
licentious inclinations, as his detractors proposed, nor on any disaffection toward 
marriage, but rather a reverence for its possibilities, and a reluctance to abandon those 
possibilities, to settle for a less than ideal marriage: “he I say who therfore seeks to part, 
is one who highly honours the married life, and would not stain it” (940). In The Doctrine 
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and Discipline of Divorce, he said that “in Gods intention a meet and happy conversation 
is the chiefest and the noblest end of marriage” (938), and he goes on to explain the 
reason for the existence of marriage: 
What is it then but that desire which God put into Adam in Paradise before 
he knew the sin of incontinence; that desire which God saw it was not 
good that man should be left alone to burn in; the desire and longing to put 
off an unkindly solitarines by uniting another body, but not without a fit 
soule to his in the cheerfull society of wedlock. Which if it were so 
needfull before the fall, when man was much more perfect in himselfe, 
how much more is it needfull now against all the sorrows and casualties of 
this life to have an intimate and speaking help, a ready and reviving 
associate in marriage. (939)  
As it was for Adam, so it is for all who have followed him: the putting off of an 
“unkindly solitarines” is the chief aim of marriage, and converse with a ready and 
reviving associate is the most effective means to assuage this solitariness. To be married 
to an incompatible mate fails to accomplish that goal, and, in that that failure is contrary 
to God’s purpose, Milton believed that when a couple is incompatible, it would be in 
keeping with God’s intentions that the couple separate.  
The general tenor of Milton’s writings on divorce is that if the purpose of 
marriage is to assuage loneliness, and it does not do so, then the marriage has no purpose 
and is best dissolved because “not to be belov'd & yet retain'd, is the greatest injury to a 
gentle spirit” (940). The “fit soule” manifested in the “intimate and speaking help [of] a 
ready and reviving associate” is the chief element of compatibility in the “cheerfull 
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society of wedlock.” Converse and not sexuality is Milton’s method that a couple uses to 
become ‘one flesh.’ Hannah Demaray argues that “while Milton may be of ‘two minds’ 
on the subject of women, he gives remarkable representation to the cohesive nature of 
‘converse’ and ‘conversation’ in the divorce tracts and years later in the graceful 
exchanges of Eve and Adam” (24). Indeed Milton has displayed some confusion about 
and inability to resolve the status of women, seeming very much to be as Demaray says, 
of “two minds” on the subject; but he is quite unequivocal about the value women 
possess as a partner in converse. The cohesive nature of converse is the method for Adam 
and Eve to become of one mind and thus of one flesh.  
Given Milton’s enthusiasm for the sexual component in marriage, there is the 
possibility that he has conflated the idea of congress with that of converse. While it seems 
possible if not likely that “converse” is a euphemism of sorts for sexual congress—the 
O.E.D even includes ‘intercourse’ among its roster of convivial synonyms7—there are 
indications that it is not. When speaking to God about his desire for a companion, Adam 
says, “in thee / Is no deficience found; not so is Man, / But in degree, the cause of his 
desire / By conversation with his like to help, / Or solace his defects” (8.415-9). 
Conversation is the way to help and solace, as opposed to the usual sexual suspects that 
are dismissed thusly by Milton: “that the dignity & blessing of mariage is plac’t rather in 
the mutual enjoyment of that which the wanting soul needfully seeks, then of that which 
the plenteous body would joyfully give away” (Doctrine 940). Surely what the plenteous 
                                                
7 OED: converse: 1. a. Intercourse; = conversation n. 2, 3 Obs. exc. in certain expressions now referred to 
3. 1610   J. Guillim Display of Heraldrie iii. vi. 103   The mutuall conuerse of humane Society. 1615   G. 
Sandys Relation of Journey i. 50   Enfeebled with the continual conuerse of women. 1646   Sir T. Browne 
Pseudodoxia Epidemica 378   By converse or copulation. 1653   H. More Antidote Atheism (1712) ii. iv. 
51   Sociableness or love of Converse. 
3.  a. Familiar interchange of thoughts; discourse, talk; = conversation n. 
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body would joyfully give away are sexual favors, and Milton has here drawn a distinction 
between that and the blessing of marriage. There is more than one kind of mutual 
enjoyment for the married couple, and while the body and even perhaps the mind may 
seek gratification through sexual avenues, the soul ‘needfully seeks’ the mutual 
enjoyment of converse.   
Milton attempted in Tetrachordon to define the ideal marriage, and in Paradise 
Lost he tried to describe it; what all the attempts to depict good marriage throughout his 
writing career have in common is the central importance of converse. Fellowship and 
converse are the aims of marriage, and the signifier of a good marriage; “that sociable 
and helpfull aptitude which God implanted between man and woman toward each other” 
(940) is the ready and easy way to achieve these aims. In Paradise Lost, when Adam asks 
God to supply him with a mate, he describes to God what he is looking for in a 
companion: 
        Of fellowship I speak 
Such as I seek, fit to participate  
All rational delight, wherein the brute 
Cannot be human consort; they rejoice 
Each with thir kinde, Lion with Lioness; 
So fitly them in pairs thou hast combin’d; 
Much less can Bird with Beast, or Fish with Fowle  
So well converse, nor with the Ox the Ape.  (8.389-96) 
Adam wants only what the other animals in Eden possess, a mate. In his request, he 
mentions not sex, nor beauty, nor gardening skill.  He asks for someone to talk to, to 
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participate in rational delight (not carnal), a consort who will speak the same language, as a 
bird would with another bird; share the same concerns, as would the lion and the lioness. 
And later, when Adam perceives the threat of the loss of Eve as a result of her original sin, 
he laments not the prospect of the loss of conjugal embraces, but of conjugal conversations: 
“How can I live without thee, how forgoe / Thy sweet Converse and Love so dearly joyn’d, 
/ To live again in these wilde Woods forlorn?” (9.910). To Milton this sweet converse is 
the most crucial element of marriage, the element that Adam most craved to find in 
marriage beforehand, and most feared the loss of afterwards. Converse is what allows a 
marriage to transcend the ordinary coupling of beasts and to approach the ideal of the 
couple becoming “one flesh.” 
The marriage of Adam and Eve was, for Milton, the model for all marriage, and 
though the most crucial element is the converse between the pair, another precondition 
must also be in place for a marriage to be happy: that precondition is voluntariness. In 
Tetrachordon, he held out the marriage of Adam and Eve as the exemplar for all 
marriage, and he specified the importance of its voluntariness:  
“To be inform’d aright in the whole History of Mariage, that we may 
know for certain, not by a forc’t yoke, but by an impartial definition, what 
Mariage is, and what is not Mariage; it will undoubtedly be safest, fairest, 
and most with our obedience, to enquire, as our Saviours direction is, how 
it was in the beginning” (Tetrachordon 1029). 
Just as God “Our voluntarie service he requires,” so too does marriage require the element 
of voluntariness. According to Magro “for Milton it is precisely voluntariness…that marks 
his conception of marriage off from earlier Catholic and ecclesiastical models in general. A 
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marriage containing any aspect of compulsion is no marriage according to Milton” (102). 
The free will of the participants in a marriage is as important to the success of the marriage 
as their sociability, as it is likely that a lack of voluntariness would have an adverse affect 
on the converse and sociability. In Paradise Lost, Eve’s marriage to Adam was “not by a 
forc’t yoke” (Tetrachordon 1029) because in Eden, “force upon free Will hath here no 
place” (9.1174-5). Milton is at some pains to attempt to establish this as an indisputable 
fact, but the voluntariness of Eve’s betrothal to Adam does not seem to be a closed issue: 
she was created to be “a helper fit for him” (Gen. 2:18), and thus it is not unreasonable to 
assume that it was God’s will that she be Adam’s bride, and when God wills an event to 
happen, it becomes destiny, and therefore not really Eve’s decision. But Milton considers 
Eve’s participation to be voluntary, and portrays it as such in Paradise Lost.  
Eve’s supposedly narcissistic dalliance with her reflection in the pool serves to 
illustrate that voluntariness. When at first she declines Adam’s overtures, she is gently 
enticed by God to reconsider, but is pointedly not forced to do so. She is coaxed rather than 
coerced: 
    there I had fixt  
Mine eyes till now, and pin'd with vain desire, 
Had not a voice thus warnd me, What thou seest, 
What there thou seest fair Creature is thy self, 
With thee it came and goes: but follow me, 
And I will bring thee where no shadow staies  
Thy coming, and thy soft imbraces, hee 
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Whose image thou art, him thou shalt enjoy 
Inseparablie thine. (4.465-73) 
The voice of God convinces Eve rather than compelling her by tempting her away from the 
tantalizing image of her own face with the more attainable prospect of one ‘whose image 
thou art’ which she is likely to find appealing because she has just shown an attraction for 
her image reflected in the pool. The argument is effective, but not compelling. She seems 
to relent: “what could I doe / But follow strait, invisibly thus led?” (4.475-6), which is 
moving closer to the language of compulsion, but she turns away again at the first sight of 
Adam. And when Adam interjects on his own behalf, she still resists, only relenting when 
“thy gentle hand / Seisd mine, I yielded” (4.488-9), where the seemingly forceful word 
‘seisd’ is tempered by the word ‘gentle’ implying that Eve is only being instructed in what 
will be to her best advantage, rather than compelled to do what is to the advantage of 
others.  
Milton equivocates somewhat on Eve’s status as a subjugated being who may be 
closer to submissive than merely cooperative. She is not portrayed as submissive to Adam 
in her behavior, but seems always ready to submit if Adam calls for it. In the labor debate 
of Book 9, for instance, she does not hesitate to take a position contrary to Adam’s, and 
even, based on the result, to out-argue him, but before she separates from him she is careful 
to utter the words, “With thy permission then” (9.378). Milton’s equivocation continues 
when, at Satan’s first glimpse of Eve, he describes her as she yields “with coy submission, 
modest pride, / And sweet reluctant amourous delay” (4.311), these words intended to 
indicate a willingness on her part, tempered only by modesty, not uncooperativeness. And 
while Magro has implied, when referring to “Catholic and ecclesiastical models in 
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general,” that Milton’s conception of marriage is a sizable step away from the Pauline 
model of marriage and toward a more enlightened view of marriage as a partnership, it is 
not yet free of the constraints that St. Paul’s writings had imposed over the marriages of 
Christians. And despite the fact that the idea of voluntariness in a marriage is very 
important to Milton because it validates the free will of the participants, he did seem to 
inject a degree of submissiveness into Eve, to temper her free will with a kind of what he 
might perceive as feminine charm, perhaps as an example of what he perceived to be the 
natural state that would permit submissiveness to be voluntary. But he has drawn a fine line 
between inwardly willing submissiveness and compulsion from without. A fine line that his 
contemporaries no doubt found acceptable, but that present day minds must question, as it 
is difficult to reconcile the presence of submission with the absence of compulsion, as there 
needs be something to submit to for submission to be present. Perhaps to Milton it is a 
matter of the choice on a woman’s part being not whether or not she will submit but only to 
whom she will submit.  
 
A Pauline State of Affairs  
The issue of Eve’s free will in Paradise Lost is complicated by Milton’s failure to 
have come to a full reconciliation to St. Paul’s call for the subordination of woman, 
which is never given a full-throated endorsement by Milton, but which is never fully 
abandoned either, as he vacillates between Eve as subordinate and as independent. In 
“Tetrachordon,” Milton gives voice to a somewhat unusual opinion for his times 
regarding the niceties of marriage that is perhaps pertinent here: 
Therefore his [St. Paul’s] precept is, Wives be subject to your husbands as 
is fit in the Lord, Coloss. 3. 18. In every thing, Eph. 5. 24. [Milton’s 
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italics.] Nevertheless man is not to hold her as a servant, but receives her 
into a part of that empire which God proclaims him to, though not equally, 
yet largely, as his own image and glory: for it is no small glory to him, that 
a creature so like him, should be made subject to him. Not but that 
particular exceptions may have place, if she exceed her husband in 
prudence and dexterity, and he contentedly yeeld; for then a superior and 
more naturall law comes in, that the wiser should govern the lesse wise, 
whether male or female.  (1030) 
This troublesome passage seems to be Milton’s attempt to explicate and justify the 
Pauline call for the subordination of women, but it also seems like an attempt to reconcile 
St. Paul’s beliefs about the proper placement of women with his own; both attempts seem 
to be less than successful, fed perhaps by Milton’s own vestigial sexist predilections. 
While seeing that she is elevated above a servant, Milton qualifies his description of the 
status of woman by the phrase “though not equally;” she is still “subject to him” 
establishing her status as secondary. The most significant problem with this passage 
seems to be the reasoning with regard to the exception where “if she exceed her husband 
in prudence and dexterity.” The phrases “not equally” and “made subject to him” and 
later in the same piece, “so man is the head of woman” (1030) and “from her the first sin 
proceeded, which keeps her justly in the same proportion still beneath” (1030) make 
abundantly clear that marriage equality is not Milton’s aim. But he seems to be conflicted 
if not outright confused when he speaks of “particular exceptions.” Although he appears 
to dismiss the idea of equality in marriage, Milton is more sure that in a marriage there 
must be a ‘head’ than upon whose shoulders it should sit. The peace of the household in 
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question rests on the contented yielding of the husband, regardless of the (relative) degree 
of “prudence and dexterity” that the wife possesses, and since that contented yielding-
ness can be rescinded and reinstated by the man at any time, the head might be forced to 
change bodies repeatedly.  
“Particular exceptions” are the downfall of rules. If this sort of exception is 
possible, then it is not the femaleness of the woman that disqualifies her for rule, but her 
suitability, her prudence and dexterity. If some women are indeed suitable, then who 
should rule is whoever is best-qualified to rule. If prudence and dexterity are the chief 
qualities that a ruler should possess, he or she who is most in possession of these qualities 
is best qualified to rule, thus “so man is the head of woman” is not always the case, and 
the fact that “from her the first sin proceeded” is rendered irrelevant. Milton is perhaps 
seeking recourse here in the aforementioned ‘naturall law’ supposing it to indicate that 
man is most often in possession of the traits that endorse his rule. But these seem to be 
thin legs of reasoning that he stands upon; a “superior and naturall law” that “the wiser 
should govern the lesse wise, whether male or female” should not be subject to anything 
as arbitrary and changeable as the contended yielding of a man. This quote also goes 
against the grain of the commonplace accusation of uxoriousness on Adam’s part as it 
demarcates circumstances under which it is acceptable and appropriate for Adam to yield 
his position of dominance which in a sexist world where such things as uxoriousness are 
categorically condemned there are no such acceptable circumstances. This is another 
example of Milton’s failure to resolve or give a sound determination of his own 
sentiments regarding Eve’s rightful place in the world.  
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Eve’s subordinate status appears to be an invention of exegetical convention 
supported by the popular opinion of the male of the species who has maintained a 
position of dominance over the female by force of will and perhaps just plain force, but 
not apparently as a matter of biblical authority. In Paradise Lost, Adam is castigated, 
“Was shee thy God” (10.145), for his inclination to treat Eve as an equal, but, as Turner 
points out, “if God ‘ordained’ her obedience and inferiority, then He did so in a scene that 
neither Scripture8 nor Milton has recorded” (282). With regard to Eve’s status, Milton 
seems to be bowing to convention and the exegetical authority of St. Paul rather than 
following his own authorial inclinations which seem to incline toward an unprecedented 
degree of equality and autonomy for Eve. In much the same way that Milton never seems 
to settle on a final version of his religion, he never really seems to decide what he thinks 
about Eve. Milton has undeniably come closer to accepting an ideal of feminine equality 
than is the custom in his culture—or moreover accepting feminine equality as an ideal— 
but he has declined to take the next step and accept the ideal as a practice. Turner asserts 
that, “Milton’s Eve is not perfect in the sense of self-sufficient, of course, any more than 
Adam is; but compared with every other version she is an autonomous and well-rounded 
character with specific counterparts to Adam’s mental and physical skills, happily able to 
out-argue him in matters that concern her own sphere of expertise” (281). In Paradise 
Lost, Milton has acknowledged the high value of womankind in general and Eve in 
particular, but despite her skills and expertise, and her companionate converse, he can not 
bring himself to endorse her fully-fledged equality, nor is he willing to exculpate Adam 
from the traditional accusation of uxoriousness.  
 
                                                
8 St. Paul’s New Testament musings notwithstanding, there is no such ordination in Genesis. 
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Uxorious Adam  
    
 
Milton addresses conventional perceptions of Adam’s uxoriousness as well as 
Eve’s vanity in Paradise Lost, but fails to arrive at a genuine resolution to either of these 
problematic matters revealing his conflicted positions on the matter of Eve’s proper place 
in her marriage and her status as a woman in the world. Milton’s conception of his epic 
poem was greatly influenced by his singular brand of Protestantism, which encompasses 
the influences of Arianism as well as his deference to St. Paul, and by his own somewhat 
confused views of women and marriage, which while more considerate of the woman’s 
perspective seem to be still swayed by the conventional thought of his time. The subject 
of Eve’s status and Adam’s uxoriousness are of course interrelated: in order to establish 
what would be the appropriate manner of treatment that Adam should afford Eve, Milton 
would have had to resolve the question of Eve’s status more fully. Paradise Lost does not 
proffer any indication that he had settled his beliefs on these subjects, with Milton 
apparently choosing both to discount the accusation of uxoriousness against Adam while 
still accusing him of it. As a result, Adam reflects Milton’s same irresolution in his 
treatment of Eve, causing her status to vacillate between coequal and vassal. The blame 
for this irresolution rests as much with Milton and his God as with Adam. 
In Paradise Lost, before the fall, having hearkened to Adam’s plea for a mate, 
Milton’s God concludes “it not good for Man to be alone” (8.445) and resolves to create 
a “fit help” (8.450) for Adam, who is undoubtedly pleased with the creation of Eve, 
perhaps to the point of being overly fond of and indulgent toward her, in a word, 
uxorious. For those who are disinclined to blame Eve alone for the fall, accusing Adam 
of uxoriousness serves as a way to deflect some or all of that blame away from Eve and 
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toward Adam. After the fall, Eve herself indulged in the practice of blaming Adam for 
her misstep, as the epic voice had predicted she would: “And left to her self, if evil thence 
ensue, / Shee first his weak indulgence will accuse” (9.1185-6). God saw fit to scold 
Adam for this failing as well, both in the Bible (Gen.3:17) and in Milton’s epic (10.145-
57). But Adam as uxorious is not the only way to look at this episode. In Paradise Lost, 
Adam does indeed describe Eve as “so lovly faire, / That what seemd fair in all the 
World, seemd now / Mean” (8.471-3). He sees her as the most sublime of God’s 
creations, adjudging her “the sum of earthly bliss / Which I enjoy.” And while he 
acknowledges her inferiority, “For well I understand in the prime end / Of Nature her th' 
inferiour” (8.540-1), he betrays that judgment to be half-hearted when he follows it with: 
“yet when I approach / Her loveliness, so absolute she seems / And in her self compleat” 
(8.546-8). In this quote, he seems at first to be parroting what he has been told, and then 
following it with what his own experience tells him. Raphael tries to disavow him of 
these notions of Eve’s worthiness, assuring him that he is the head of the household and 
that Eve’s beauty is of secondary status when compared to his formidable talents: 
Oft times nothing profits more 
Then self esteem, grounded on just and right 
Well manag’d; of that skill the more thou know’st, 
The more she will acknowledge thee her Head, 
And to realities yield all her shows. (8.571-5) 
But Adam is unsure of the parameters of his responsibility, and clings to his own 
judgment of Eve’s value: “Authority and Reason on her waite, / As one intended first, not 
after made” (8.555). Adam thus gives God the benefit of the doubt, assuming Eve to be 
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something more substantial than an afterthought for God; assuming her to be, as second-
created, an improvement over the prototype. 
To Adam, Eve is just as he wished her to be, and stands in need of no 
improvement. She seems to him the fulfillment of his desires, just as God had promised: 
“What next I bring shall please thee, be assr’d, / Thy likeness, thy fit help, thy other self, / 
Thy wish, exactly to thy hearts desire” (8.449-51; my emphasis), but despite Raphael’s 
admonishment, Adam’s original request of God seems to be much more of a request for 
an equal than for a subordinate: 
Among unequals what societie 
Can sort, what harmonie or true delight? 
Which must be mutual, in proportion due  
Giv’n and receiv’d; but in disparitie 
The one intense, the other still remiss 
Cannot well suite with either, but soon prove 
Tedious alike: Of fellowship I speak 
Such as I seek, fit to participate  
All rational delight, wherein the brute 
Cannot be human consort. (8.383-91) 
Adam discounts the value of the possibility that unequals can engage in gratifying 
society, achieve harmony or true delight. Mutuality is intense; disparity, remiss. He 
desires fellowship with a like consort; this is how Adam describes the fulfillment of his 
‘hearts desire’ to God. Yet when Adam waxes poetic about how pleased he is with the 
gift God has given him, Raphael cautions him that she is not his equal, but one of those 
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“things / Less excellent” (8.565-6). But Raphael’s reasoning is problematic: if Eve is to 
be Adam’s “wish, exactly to thy hearts desire,” it is for Adam to define her as he sees fit, 
not Raphael, nor even God. And what Adam sees is something so wondrous as to defy 
the descriptions as a subordinate that he is spoon-fed by Raphael. The charge of 
uxoriousness carries with it an implication of the unworthiness of woman to be treated as 
an equal, but to Adam Eve is anything but unworthy: “Greatness of mind and nobleness 
thir seat / Build in her loveliest, and create an awe / About her, as a guard Angelic plac't” 
(8.556-8). Adam is tacitly asking how it is that this creature is inferior, and no one ever 
gives him an acceptable explanation. Adam’s fondness for Eve is an appreciation of the 
creative powers of God more than an overvaluing of that creation. Raphael seems to be 
the mouthpiece of St. Paul, while perhaps Adam is closer to Milton’s own conflicted 
thinking on the subject of Eve’s status, wondering just how it is that she is inferior and 
why it is that God would create an inferior creature.  
The impossibility of defining uxoriousness before fully defining man and woman 
and their respective roles creates for Milton a Gordian knot which he is unable to cleave. 
Milton, while still trying to portray Adam as Eve’s superior, wants nonetheless to portray 
Eve as a free agent. Milton has gone to some lengths to establish this free agency, 
particularly in the changing of the biblical story from their being together during the 
temptation to having them separate. This one small change creates the unquestionable 
free agency that Milton and Eve both crave. But critics such as Stella Revard and Fredson 
Bowers believe that Adam’s acquiescence to Eve’s wish to work separately should be 
held responsible for the couple’s loss of Paradise: that had Adam been more assertive, as 
he should have been, and rebuffed Eve’s entreaties, the pair would have been together at 
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the temptation and thus they would not have succumbed to the Devil’s wiles. Revard asks 
“who does not think that [Eve] …would not be ravished of her innocence if her husband 
had not permitted her to fare forth unprotected?” (69), implying that the fall of Man could 
have been averted if only the man had not fallen victim to the feminine wiles of his mate, 
that having allowed Eve to find herself in a predicament for which she was ill-equipped 
that Adam therefore bears the ultimate responsibility for her actions. Revard concurs with 
critics who “have argued that the cause of Eve’s fall, and thus the responsibility for it, lies 
with the husband who sanctioned her exposure, not with the circumstance of that 
exposure” (69), squarely placing the blame at Adam’s uxorious feet. Another such critic, 
Bowers, maintains that “Adam had no right to relieve himself from his responsibility to 
Eve by making her a free agent. In so doing he failed in his duty both to her and to God” 
(271). Bowers believes that Adam does not have the right to make her a free agent 
because in his permissive treatment of Eve he has imperiled her soul and that Adam’s 
responsibility to administer her bodily and spiritual well-being supersedes his 
responsibility to foster her free will. But in assuming Eve to be Adam’s responsibility and 
denying her status as a free agent, Revard and Bowers have relieved Eve of the 
responsibility for her own actions and denied her the self-determination that is according 
to Milton’s God an essential, eternal, and unchangeable part of her nature. These critics 
have overlooked Milton’s ambiguous position with regard to Adam’s responsibility for 
Eve’s actions. They are ready to blame Adam and exonerate Eve even when Milton 
himself is not ready to commit to this resolution. 
Milton vacillates between blaming Eve and blaming Adam, perhaps wishing to 
blame them jointly, but not equally. By acting apart from Adam, Eve has knowingly or 
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not accepted the burden of responsibility of the free agent—at least in theory. In actual 
practice however, Milton has Eve balk at this responsibility: after her adamant advocacy 
for separation, she concludes with a request for permission, “With thy permission then” 
(9.378), thus backing away from responsibility for the actions that follow, and 
reburdening Adam with it. Then, after getting what she has asked for, when the results 
turn out bad, she chastises Adam for not forbidding her separation and thus preventing 
disaster: “Being as I am, why didst not thou the Head / Command me absolutely not to 
go” (9.1155), as if she believed that it were his responsibility, abrogated irresponsibly, to 
deny her free will. Eve’s confusion may reflect Milton’s own somewhat conflicted 
attitude toward women and their ability or inability to embrace full responsibility for their 
actions, and the conundrum of their free will being clouded by their subordination. 
Eve’s separation from Adam is an example of the freedom that an individual is 
entitled to as having been created in the image of God, who has defined free will as an 
integral component of humanity. Adam declines to forbid Eve to separate from him when 
she suggests that they “divide our labours” (9.214) and this refusal has not gone 
uncriticized, by God in particular, who when He asks: Was shee thy God, that her thou 
didst obey /  Before his voice” (10.145-6) reminds the reader of the line “Shee for God in 
him” (4.299)  forcing the question ‘was Adam then Eve’s God, that she should obey him 
before God’s voice?’ And when He asks Adam, “Was shee thy God?” this question 
implies that it is only God who can relieve him of this responsibility for Eve. When God 
instructs Adam or Eve to do something or to refrain from doing something (such as 
tasting of the fruit), God accepts the responsibility for the action or inaction that He has 
endorsed; the responsibility only shifts to the human when they disobey, decline to follow 
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orders, act contrary to God’s wishes. By requiring Adam to act in a certain fashion, God 
has relieved Adam from the responsibility for these actions (and coincidentally deprived 
Adam of his own self-determination in this instance): as long as whomever is obedient, 
they should be safe from any adverse consequences of that obedience, whereas 
disobedience is an unspoken acceptance of responsibility on the part of the actor. God 
continues to castigate Adam’s behavior, asking: 
  or was shee made thy guide, 
Superior, or but equal, that to her 
Thou did’st resigne thy Manhood, and the Place 
Wherein God set thee above her made of thee, 
And for thee, whose perfection farr excell’d  
Hers in all real dignitie. (10.146-51) 
Milton’s God equates Adam’s responsibility for Eve with manhood or even Godhead: 
implying at least if not outright declaring that Adam should act toward Eve as if he were 
God, to be her guide as God is mankind’s guide, that to treat her as equal is to resign his 
superiority which is the essence of his manhood, and that God has placed Adam above 
Eve in much the same way that God is above Adam, making her his responsibility. 
Milton’s God is here essentially telling Adam that he should not have abrogated his godly 
responsibility over Eve—that he should have acted in imitation of God. But, by refusing 
to play the tyrant and forbid Eve to make her own choice of course of action, Adam is 
acting in imitation of God. In much the same way that God proscribed the fruit of tree of 
knowledge yet did not prevent Adam and Eve from eating of it, so Adam has made it 
known to Eve that he wishes her not to leave his side, yet he does not forbid her to do so. 
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He believes that it is not his prerogative: “beyond this had bin force, / And force upon 
free Will hath here no place” (9.1174-5). Adam has asked of God: “Hast thou not made 
me here thy substitute” (8.381), and again acting seemingly in imitation of God, he has 
decided against the employment of force, and yet he is chastised by God for his efforts to 
do as he believed that God would have done. 
As an individual creation of God, and a representative of humanity, Eve has her 
own personhood and consequently she alone should be responsible for her own actions as 
well as her salvation. While Adam and Milton may wish to put Eve on a pedestal for 
protection and admiration, to do so deprives her of her essential nature. She can not be 
both mistress of Adam and master of her destiny. Being “for God in him” does not 
relieve her of the responsibility for her own actions. The phrase, “shee for God in him” is 
often seen to be of great importance to the poem and to Milton, but the emphasis on “in 
him’ is misplaced. The “shee for God” is not undone by the “in him.” God will still hold 
her responsible for her actions, so if it is to be done justly, those actions must be of her 
own volition. If Adam had declined to join her in the eating of the fruit, she would have 
presumably suffered whatever the punishment alone. Adam may be upbraided by God for 
what Michael calls his “effeminate slackness” (11.634), but God will still punish Eve for 
her sin, so she must be personally responsible for it. Thus she must be permitted to make 
those choices unencumbered with any thought of subjugation or inequality. The 
descriptions of their lapses reflect separate responsibility as well as distinct punishments. 
She was deceived; he was not. She will suffer pain in childbirth; he will sweat and toil to 
coax food from the earth. Being for God in him does not put Adam between Eve and 
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God’s wrath, nor give Adam any sway over her salvation, nor does it protect her from 
damnation. 
Despite having created Eve as a member of humanity, and thus a presumptively 
self-determined individual, Milton’s God declines to fully endorse that self-
determination, and when she exercises her self determination He condemns her for doing 
so and Adam for permitting her to do so. The same freedom that is reflected in the choice 
by Adam to allow his wife to make her own decision regarding their separation is the 
freedom that gives meaning to any behavior; any behavior not freely chosen can not 
rightfully bring blame down upon the actor. The only way a man or woman can be rightly 
held accountable for their failings or successes is if they are possessed of free will and 
chose their actions. And the only way they can be held responsible for the actions of 
another is if that other does not have free will. If Adam declines to allow Eve to act in the 
manner she desires, he not only usurps her free will but burdens his own; he becomes 
consequentially responsible for her actions as well as his own. To have chosen to obey is 
what gives meaning to obedience; and to choose to disobey is what makes the wages of 
sin fair pay. Milton’s failure to unequivocally establish Eve’s degree of equality in her 
self-determination, makes her equality of responsibility iniquitous, and makes it difficult 
to answer the question of whether Eve as a creation of God is entitled to be treated as a 
free agent, or whether Adam has abrogated his responsibility as Eve’s caretaker by 
allowing her to separate from him against his wishes. Instead of choosing between the 
two options, Milton seems to trying to have it both ways, to the detriment of his God and 
his poem.  
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 Milton’s God of Paradise Lost is not, however, alone in being problematic: the 
duality arises out of the Bible itself; Milton is only guilty of failing to resolve the 
ambiguity. God’s sentence upon Adam from Genesis includes the words, “Because you 
have listened to the voice of your wife” (Gen. 3:17), implying that Adam has failed in his 
responsibility as a result of treating his wife as an equal, thus adding support to the 
accusation of uxoriousness against Adam. It is difficult to reconcile a conception of 
paradise with a place where one person is subordinate to another. Perhaps it was only 
paradise for Adam, and Eve was a mere accoutrement; being subject to the will of 
another would clearly not constitute a paradise for Eve. The implications of the term ‘one 
flesh’ (Gen. 2:24) also imply an equality in their relationship as well; becoming one flesh 
out of two separate beings is an image of equality. It suggests that both parties bring to 
their partnership equally valuable commodities, and that they both contribute more or less 
equally to the whole being greater than the sum of its parts. Eve as a discrete individual 
should not be forced to rely on Adam’s vigilance to assure her salvation. Milton’s God 
seems to be having difficulty maintaining a consistent set of expectations toward his 
creations: all decisions that redound to an individual’s salvation should be at that 
individual’s discretion. If Eve is an individual she has to be responsible for her own 
actions as well as her own salvation. 
 
Milton’s Eve  
Eve holds a special fascination for Milton. Milton’s ideal of marriage grows out 
of his ideal of womanhood, as if he conceptualized the perfect setting of marriage in 
which to place his perfect jewel, Eve. She is to Milton as Helen was to Homer, Beatrice 
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to Dante: the ideal woman. Karen Edwards asks, “Is ‘Eve’ not John Milton’s 
representation of an ideal female human being, a perfect woman—perfect, at least, before 
the fall?” (231), and indeed Milton does seem to fetishize Eve as perfect, but being 
Milton’s idea of the perfect woman does not exempt her from being problematic, in fact 
Milton’s inability to disentangle her from the web of his own fetishism and his 
personalized version of early modern sexism is the source of much that is problematic 
about her. Edwards continues, “Eve is explicitly fashioned and formed according to male 
desire—so explicitly that we need to ask whether she is a representation of Edenic 
woman, or a representation of Edenic male fantasy” (239), a legitimate question on the 
surface, but inasmuch as she was—and remains—the only Edenic woman, she is thus 
only representative of herself.  
Her status as a male fantasy however is worth considering. Created as she was by 
the masculine God to fulfill the heart’s desire of a man, she is essentially Milton’s fantasy 
of God’s fantasy of Adam’s fantasy. Adam is immediately besotted with her and offers 
nothing but praise when he speaks of her, as when he describes her to Raphael in Book 8 
as “the sum of earthly bliss / Which I enjoy” (8.522-3). Nor is her affect limited to the 
human, as despite having only a single human admirer, when she ‘went forth,’ “from 
about her shot Darts of desire / Into all Eyes to wish her still in sight” (8.62-3). Even 
Satan is, by the sight of Eve, momentarily dumbstruck: “Stupidly good, of enmitie 
disarm’d, / Of guile, of hate, of envie, of revenge” (9.465-6). The mere sight of her is a 
fulfillment of male fantasy; yet she is seemingly not good enough: she is disparaged by 
Raphael, as a thing “less excellent” (8.566) and merely “an outside” (8.568). This 
disparagement may well be another symptom of Milton’s ambiguous and paradoxical 
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relationship with the ideal of femininity and the idea of feminine equality. Milton seems 
always to approach a radical degree of sympathy toward womanhood, only to withdraw 
his favor before the act is consummated. Turner argues that, “Milton cannot be entirely 
cleared of the charges of ‘Eve-baiting’….There is clearly an undertone in the poem that 
points to the maleness of the good angels and accuses Eve of narcissism in the lake-
episode, sensual weakness in the dream, perversity in the gardening alone, and 
concupiscence in admitting Satan’s courtly amours” (291). There is certainly an 
undertone of an assumption of feminine inferiority in the poem. Milton seems to be 
unable to come to terms with his conflicted conception of Eve; she is to him both “the 
sum of earthly bliss,” and yet a thing “less excellent.” The determination of her quality 
seems to depend on who is making that determination: while God and his angels belittle 
her, Satan appreciates “her Heav'nly forme” (9.457) and to Adam she is a thing most 
excellent.  
Turner’s catalogue of her failings—narcissism, perversity, and concupiscence—is  
attributed to Milton’s Eve-baiting, but these common criticisms of Eve center on her 
being as she was created to be. She was created by God as a thing of beauty. She merely 
recognizes that beauty; she does not take credit for it. Making the charge of narcissism 
stick is difficult because the narcissism or vanity—“there I had fixt / Mine eyes till now, 
and pin'd with vain desire” (4.465-6)—of which she is often accused is not any inherent 
pathology in her. At that moment when she espies the reflected image in the water, she is 
not aware that the image with which she is entranced is her own: “A Shape within the 
watry gleam appeard / Bending to look on me, I started back, / It started back” (4.461-3). 
She is merely appreciating a thing of beauty just as everyone else does when they 
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encounter her. Her value to others has routinely been established as being chiefly 
ornamental so she is only valuing in herself what everyone else values most in her.  
No one but Adam seems to prize anything about her other than her appearance, 
and even Adam suggests that perhaps her creator went too far in bestowing her with 
beauty, and not far enough in other areas: “at least on her bestow’d / Too much of 
Ornament, in outward shew / Elaborate, of inward less exact (8.537-9). It is true that she 
is not Adam’s intellectual equal, “Of Nature her th’ inferiour, in the mind / And inward 
Faculties” (8.537-41), but he asked God only that she be “fit to participate / [in] All 
rationale delight” (8.390-1), and she may be intellectually inferior, but she is nonetheless 
able to convince Adam against his better judgment to allow her to separate from him. 
When Adam evaluates her as she actually seems to him, instead of how he is told she is 
by others, her status rises to that of an equal or perhaps even a better: 
yet when I approach 
Her loveliness, so absolute she seems 
And in her self compleat, so well to know 
Her own, that what she wills to do or say, 
Seems wisest, vertuousest, discreetest, best;  
All higher knowledge in her presence falls 
Degraded, Wisdom in discourse with her 
Looses discount’nanc’t, and like folly shewes; 
Authority and Reason on her waite, 
As one intended first, not after made  
Occasionally; and to consummate all, 
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Greatness of mind and nobleness thir seat 
Build in her loveliest, and create an awe 
About her, as a guard Angelic plac’t. (8.546-59) 
While Adam unquestionably appreciates Eve’s physical attributes, he values her for more 
than her appearance; to him she “Seems wisest, vertuousest, discreetest, best.” Though 
her intellect is degraded by God and Raphael, to him she seems possessed of something 
better – if difficult to identify – something in the face of which, knowledge and wisdom 
run for cover. Adam even goes so far as to consider it a possibility that she is an 
improvement over him, “As one intended first.” What he values is evidently different 
than what God and angels value which leads him to some degree of uncertainty about 
himself. Adam’s conflicted description to Raphael seems to indicate that he is unable to 
reconcile what he is expected to feel with what he does feel. He is reproached by Raphael 
for “attributing overmuch to things / Less excellent (8.565-6). But as she is the putative 
fulfillment of his dream, it is his to determine how fully she has filled that dream; and if 
he is uxorious, it must be possible to be overly fond of the fulfillment of one’s fondest 
dream. 
Eve’s suit for separation can be seen as an attempt to escape Adam’s oppressive 
influence or to assert power or dominance over the uxorious Adam, but Eve sees the 
separation not as a method to be rid of Adam or to dominate him, but rather as a means to 
be worthy of him. Critics William Kerrigan and Gordon Braden maintain that Eve has 
grown weary of Adam’s company and wants to be alone. They argue that Eve has 
experienced “some sense of oppressive closeness . . . some souring on the sweet flirtation 
of their daytime eroticism” (46), and that she desires to work separately from Adam 
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because she wants to get away from him. But Eve seeks neither independence from nor 
preeminence over Adam, only autonomy which is the only equality of which she 
perceives herself to be capable. She does not see herself as Adam’s equal, “I yielded, and 
from that time see / How beauty is excelld by manly grace / And wisdom, which alone is 
truly fair” (4.489-91), but wishes to be treated with the respect for her choices that she is 
entitled to as an autonomous being, a kind of qualified equality. Equality equates to worth 
for Eve, and it is in the effort “to draw his love” that she seeks it. To be Adam’s equal 
will make her more worthy of his love. She desires only to maintain a degree of 
autonomy within the confines of her marriage: “so to add what wants / In Femal Sex, the 
more to draw his Love” (9.821-2). Eve’s perception is that if she can establish herself as 
an autonomous individual (“what wants”) Adam will find her more appealing. She is 
looking only to draw more of Adam’s love, not wrest a position of dominance from him. 
God accuses Adam of having resigned his manhood to Eve (“was shee made thy guide, / 
Superior, or but equal, that to her / Thou did'st resigne thy Manhood” (10.146-8) when he 
granted her wish to separate; but Adam has only granted her the autonomy that he 
believes is not his right to deny when permits her the separation that he had argued 
against. Adam has only declined to deny Eve her free will, not ceded her the position of 
dominance from which she is uninterested in unseating him.9  
Eve’s pursuit of autonomy advances the question of whether that autonomy is a 
gift from God or a gift from Adam, of whether she is entitled to autonomy by her God-
given nature or has cozened it from an uxorious and idolatrous spouse. God created Eve 
for Adam, “Hee for God only, shee for God in him,” but He also presumably held Eve to 
                                                
9 Rudat’s contentions in "Pope’s Belinda, Milton’s Eve, And The Missionary Position" about the 
missionary versus female superior positions notwithstanding. 
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the same moral standards as He did Adam. When God punishes Eve separately from 
Adam, this tends to indicate that He sees her as a free agent, and thus responsible for her 
actions, and when He sentences her “to thy Husbands will / Thine shall submit, hee over 
thee shall rule” (10.195-6), this sounds very much like a countermanding of a previous 
status, where she would not have been ruled over by her husband. Milton’s thoughts on 
the subjugation of Eve are conflicted. God punishes Eve for her sin separately from 
Adam rather than holding him accountable for her sin, and this implies that she has the 
same free will as Adam to obey and worship God. But this implication does seem to put 
Milton’s God in a paradoxical position. He wished to be freely worshipped by Eve 
without compulsion, just as it was with Adam, which would presuppose her free will; but 
to make her a more suitable gift to Adam He has limited her free will. It seems unlikely 
that one could retain one’s free will and yet remain subjugated. The words Milton put in 
God’s mouth are at best confusing, and at worst inconsistent, but it is clear that whatever 
the extent to which she was subjugated before the fall, it increased afterwards.  
The subjugation of prelapsarian Eve is a complicated subject, and perhaps 
irresolvable. Milton seems to want Eve’s equality to end where her autonomy does. He is 
willing to grant her autonomy but not equality. And it is not clear whether she is entitled 
to the autonomy or merely granted it by Adam. Lewalski points out that: 
At the center of his epic, Milton set a richly imagined representation of 
prelapsarian love, marriage, and domestic society. It is a brilliant though 
sometimes conflicted representation, in which Milton’s internalization of 
contemporary assumptions about gender hierarchy, his idealistic view of 
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companionate marriage, his own life experiences, and his deeply felt 
emotional needs sometimes strain against each other. (479) 
The conflicted representation to which Lewalski refers is Milton again trying to have it 
both ways: he wants to show that Eve is the perfect woman, yet she is still responsible for 
the fall of man. He wants her to be obedient yet self-determined; autonomous, but not 
independent; substantive, but not equal. He is “of two minds” on the subject of women, 
and can not find reconciliation. His “internalization of contemporary assumptions about 
gender hierarchy” is in opposition to his “idealistic view of companionate marriage.” He 
finds himself in conflict between the way things ought to be—the ideal toward which 
man should strive as his duty to God—and the way things are, which, while not ideal, has 
some qualities which he is loath to surrender—specifically, the sway which man holds 
over woman.  
Milton is unable to separate himself from these gender bugaboos perhaps because 
it is too great a sacrifice of the masculine cultural advantage. “The original non-
subordination of Eve, and the original immortality of man,” that Turner alludes to, 
illustrates that what is culled from biblical texts is often more a matter of what is wished 
for than what is actually there. It has suited the purposes of men to find confirmation of 
their superiority in the biblical text, and so they have. Milton’s conflicted outlook on Eve 
is apparent to Turner as well, but he finds an artistic good in this dichotomous portrayal 
of Eve:  
Milton has succeeded in bringing to life, in the praxis of his art, two quite 
different models of the politics of love: one is drawn from the experience 
of being in love with an equal, and the mutual surrender of ‘due 
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benevolence’, the other from the hierarchical arrangement of the universe, 
and the craving for male supremacy. (285) 
Turner appears to also recognize Milton’s desire to have it both ways: an Eve who is the 
sum of earthly bliss, while still blameworthy for her own failings as well as for the fall. 
While acknowledging the “craving for male supremacy” that Milton was apparently 
unable to resist, and its coexistence with an apparent inclination on Milton’s part toward 
a view of Eve as Adam’s equal, Turner’s notion of the praxis of art may give the reader 
the best way to approach this paradox. In much the same way that it is Adam’s 
prerogative to decide what is his heart’s desire, so too each reader is entitled to see the 
paradise that they find most paradisal, and the Eve that they find most appealing. Perhaps 
in order for each reader of Paradise Lost to fully comprehend the tragedy of the loss of 
paradise, each reader must be permitted to envision the paradise that they desire. Perhaps 
it is necessary to have paradise be somewhat fluid for each reader to be able to see in 
Adam and Eve’s paradise a paradise of their own. In its zeal to establish free will, 
Paradise Lost leaves many if not every reader with the impression that if they had been 
there, things would have been different, that they would have been able to resist 
temptation, and to have remained grateful and satisfied with their share of bliss. And in 
imagining themselves in Eden, they must be able to imagine Eden as their own paradise, 
as the paradise that they would have been loath to lose. The dichotomy of Eve’s status 
provides the story with a variable narrative outlook which can be adjusted to 
accommodate the individual preferences of the reader; “thus ‘every commentator,’ as 
Voltaire said perhaps more wisely than he knew, ‘makes his own Eden’” (Turner 39). 
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Every reader must be permitted to imagine an Eden that they find paradisal; some are 
more comfortable with autonomy, others with autocracy. 
St. Paul and the other exegetical exemplars have taken a position regarding Eve’s 
subjugated status similarly motivated by their own wishes that circumstances be as they 
wished them to be rather than by the supposed textual certainties that they pretend to 
examine. In much the same way that biblical scholars have managed to present Eve’s 
subordination as a certainty in the text of the book of Genesis despite the fact that as 
Turner said, “if God ‘ordained’ her obedience and inferiority, then He did so in a scene 
that neither Scripture nor Milton has recorded” (282). In fact the very chapter that these 
exegetes put forth as evidence of Eve’s subordination actually supplies us with the best 
evidence against their position. In the Genesis version of the story of Adam and Eve, Eve 
is indeed created for Adam, and her creation is explained as fulfilling Adam’s need for a 
helper (“there was not found a helper fit for him” (Gen. 2:20).) This stands in support of 
the inference of her subordination, but, ironically, the chief support for the argument 
against her subordination in Eden is the sentence God pronounces against her as a result 
of the fall, which includes the proviso “he shall rule over you” (Gen. 3:16). As Turner has 
pointed out, “there would be little point in announcing her subjection to her husband as a 
dire consequence of the fall (“. . . 3.16 ”) if she were already a subordinate” (16). 
Inasmuch as God bothered to utter this pronouncement, it is reasonable to infer that this 
‘rule’ is a new circumstance, and that Adam’s rule over Eve did not begin until this 
pronouncement was uttered.  
Turner suspects that Eve’s subordination is an exegetical addendum rather than a 
textual certainty. He credits the male desire for domination:  
Kimball 66 
 
The ideological imperative, the passionate desire to dominate the female, 
thus has the power to override the hermeneutic process itself. The original 
non-subordination of Eve, and the original immortality of man, are equally 
inferable from the text; and yet one is almost universally accepted, and the 
other almost universally denied. (119) 
Biblical scholars see what they want to see in the biblical text. It is a kind of self-
fulfilling prophecy where exegetical principles have been overcome by the desire of the 
exegetical principals to justify an ideology; as if they had decided what they would find 
before they looked, and apparently wishing to see Eve as a subordinate, they manage to 
do just that. Turner indicates that this is a longstanding tradition: 
None of the significations agreed upon by the exegetes—the presence of 
Satan, the promise of a redeemer, the ‘fall’ and original sin, the notion that 
Adam and Eve represented the most perfect stage of humanity—has any 
basis in the text. The most stubborn of all these shadowy assumptions, the 
secondary status of Eve, is almost equally unfounded. (129) 
These exegetical entrepreneurs were willing to inject these notions into the text and 
occasionally formulate entire religious denominations around them, catechisms about 
them, and occasional heresy accusations against those who would disagree. Those who 
determined Eve’s subject status allowed their own personal interests to obscure their 
vision in determining that Eve was Adam’s subordinate. John Shawcross too seems to see 
a hint of conspiracy in this subjugation of Eve, when he makes the point that, “because 
the Bible came out of a male-dominated society it should be clear why God is male and 
why a holy trinity likened to a family finally came into religious thought as Christianity 
Kimball 67 
 
was being organized . . . ” (208), the premise being that male superiority is a male-created 
bugaboo intended to intimidate women and help to maintain the male dominance that had 
served the male so well for so long. Being the divinely-endorsed dominant sex is 
certainly a boon to the male of the species, and it was in the best interests of these 
exegetes, themselves men, to find that male-dominance was the biblical norm so that they 
might maintain that status as the dominant party of humanity.  
Perhaps that desire to maintain the societal upper hand led the exegetes in 
question, not wishing to surrender male-dominance as the status quo, to emphasize God’s 
pronouncement against Eve as the dominant text to be considered, ignoring the seeming 
contradictions. That domination becomes easier to maintain as the status quo if it can be 
established that it is what God wants, the status deo as it were, and that it has been that 
way since the first humans came into being. Milton was equally guilty of this inclination 
to see what he wanted to see in the biblical text, a reverence for “how it was in the 
beginning” (Tetrachordon 1029), but he never seemed to be able to decide precisely what 
it was that he wanted to see where Eve was concerned. His idea that a woman can be 
permitted to rule a household with the willing endorsement of her husband gives us an 
idea of his inclinations, and it could be seen as the first step in a process of gender 
equalization. If it is acceptable for a woman to assume a dominant position in some 
particular circumstances, then it becomes only a matter of how often these circumstances 
accrue, and should they exceed the fiftieth percentile, then man is no longer the dominant 
party. Milton here seems to be approaching an admittedly unprecedented approximation 
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of gender equity, but refuses to cross the threshold, perhaps in fear of St. Paul10 being on 
the other side.  
 
Eve’s Design Flaw   
While blaming Adam’s uxoriousness or attributing it to Milton’s concession to St. 
Paul are perhaps more popular, there is another possible explanation for the predicament 
in which Eve found herself when confronted unaccompanied by Satan. One might blame 
the designer for a design flaw in the make-up of humankind: if the failure was due to an 
inherent flaw in the subjects then it is not they who are to blame for their actions, but the 
designer. Milton as designer of God and God as designer of Adam and Eve are both to 
blame for these difficulties. There is a design flaw in Eve, “this fair defect / Of Nature” 
(10.891-2). She is created for the pleasure of a man, but Eve has the same nature that is 
native to any human; she has free will. But Milton complicates the free will that Eve, by 
his own definition, has as a representative of humanity by trying to simultaneously 
portray her as in some way somewhat subordinate to Adam. Despite the apparent mutual 
exclusivity of these two qualities, Milton tries to have it both ways, and he winds up with 
a misapprehended creation that 400 years have not been able to explain properly. This 
situation is of course not entirely of Milton’s own making; he is after all only trying to 
reconcile his Biblical source material with his own conception of reality, but it is a 
difficult if not impossible task. Speaking of the passages where Milton tries to establish 
Eve’s subordinate nature and her complaisant attitude toward it (4.297-9 & 488-91)), 
                                                
10 As the note from The Riverside Milton states, “Milton was a moderate, if not a liberal, on the subject of 
the subordination of women in marriage, though he was bound by St. Paul’s various pronouncements about 




Shawcross maintains that “these various passages define the subordinationism underlying 
Milton’s view of humankind, but one that fits into a full range of being from God the 
Father down to the lowest of animal life. Further, of course, it attempts to offer some 
prototypical ways of looking at man—given to mental and physical activity—and at 
woman—beautiful and passive” (10-11). This subordinationism is the source of the 
problem for Milton, if not the very problem itself.  Milton is unable to escape his desire 
to portray Eve as subordinate according to the bent of his culture, while attempting to 
describe her as self-determined according to the bent of her supposed God-given nature, 
but in doing so he is not able to reconcile her subordination without impeding her free 
agency. Eve’s reason-for-being conflicts with the nature of her being. If she was created 
for Adam and ostensibly belongs to Adam, her free will is compromised by her 
subjugation and secondary status. She can not be free and self-determined and yet 
subjugated to Adam.  
Milton’s attempt at a resolution to this enigma of the conflict between Eve’s free 
will and her duty to her husband resembles the function of the prelapsarian code 
discussed earlier that asks Adam and Eve for obedience as a sign of their love for God. 
God supposes that those who love Him will obey Him as a result of that love and not 
require any other reason to do so; they will leave the fruit unmolested because they know 
that is what He wishes. Adam – as he often is – in imitation of God hopes for much the 
same unquestioning obedience from Eve. Like God, Adam does not want reason to be the 
guide of Eve’s behavior. Adam wants obedience for the sake of love to be a good enough 
reason for Eve to change her mind and amend her behavior. The solution that Adam finds 
most appealing is for Eve to willingly defer to his greater wisdom and stay by his side, 
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but she is unwilling to do so. When she declines to be willingly obedient, he declines to 
compel her, once more in imitation of God. Eve will relent in this wish to separate only if 
forbidden by Adam to proceed (”with thy permission then”), but she will not relent just to 
please him. Adam, who staunchly believes that “force upon free Will hath here no place” 
(9.1175), is thus put in the position where he must decide what is more important, Eve’s 
acquiescence to his wishes or Eve’s free will, and like God, when He put the tree of the 
forbidden fruit within mankind’s reach, Adam decides for the latter rather than the 
former. 
Milton’s God, as designer, is also blameworthy for this failure of reconciliation 
due to the fact that dominion over his mate seems to never have been sought by Adam, 
and once foisted upon him is little appreciated. Having granted him dominion over the 
beasts of the land, birds of the air, and fish of the sea, God seems to have chosen to 
extend that dominion over Adam’s spouse as well, and to make Adam into a miniature 
version of himself. God expected that this would be seen by Adam as a fine thing; that he 
would be pleased and act accordingly. Adam has acted in imitation of God in most cases, 
but in this case, the responsibility lies heavily upon his shoulders and he is unwilling to 
bear it. Adam had asked God to supply him with a “helpmeet” which is for his purposes a 
friend and companion with which to share his existence. But God has instead burdened 
Adam with a charge and a responsibility. Adam’s appeal to God for a mate (8.389-97) 
made no mention of a subordinate; he asked for fellowship, a consort, and these are not 
words of the language of subordination. As Turner states, “Adam’s most fervent desire is 
for an equal—a desire so deeply rooted in his being that it gives him the astonishing 
ability to argue down the Almighty within minutes of his creation” (280). Surely Adam 
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can not be held responsible for God’s failure to fulfill his wish “exactly to thy hearts 
desire” (8.451), and thus God, as designer, must take at least a share of the responsibility 
for the fall, despite His having neither predestined nor willed it.  
 
Eve’s Uncloistered Virtue  
 Adam’s acquiescence to Eve’s request for a separation has been called uxorious 
and has shared God’s blame for their fall with Eve’s inability to brook restraint, but 
Adam’s behavior is not uxorious, and neither is it the cause of the fall. To blame his 
uxoriousness for the fall is to deny Eve the responsibility for her own actions. McColley 
argues that “Adam’s respect for Eve’s liberty, though imitating God’s for his own, is then 
a first step in the Fall” (“Free Will and Obedience” 105). But Adam’s behavior is only a 
step, and perhaps not even the first one. Adam’s respect for Eve’s liberty is, in addition to 
being in imitation of God’s respect for Adam’s liberty, a manifestation of his love for 
Eve, but it is not selfless, nor is it his only reason. Adam allowed Eve to separate from 
him as a way to establish that her continued presence at his side is voluntary. The 
voluntary quality of Eve’s presence can only be confirmed by her voluntary return, and in 
order to effect her return, he must permit her departure. As McColley puts it: “Adam is 
learning to recognize Eve as a gifted individual and to value her liberty of will, which, 
along with its challenging liabilities, makes possible the dignity and joy of love freely 
given” (“Free Will and Obedience” 112). To gain confirmation that Eve’s continued 
companionship is freely given, he must grant her autonomy, give her the opportunity to 
choose to do otherwise.  
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Adam and Eve are both diffident of one another’s motives and love. In response 
to Eve’s request for separation, Adam’s response, “But if much converse perhaps / Thee 
satiate, to short absence I could yield” betrays his wounded feelings, and nearly 
everything Eve does throughout the poem is in an effort to gain and hold Adam’s love. 
Both of them feel the need to establish that the fondness that the heart feels is not the love 
of a slave for a gentle master, but the freely given love of free individuals which can only 
be established through a voluntary separation for: “how / Can hearts, not free, be tri’d 
whether they serve / Willing or no, who will but what they must / By Destinie, and can no 
other choose?” (5.529-34). A voluntary return from an absence freely permitted 
legitimizes the behavior of both parties. Adam says that compulsion has no place in Eden, 
but these are empty words until he demonstrates that he means to abide by them. The 
separation is where Adam’s words make the leap to actions, demonstrating that he 
believes in the principles he speaks, and is willing to translate them to actions despite his 
reservations about the likely outcome. Eve even gives him the opportunity to refuse her 
permission to separate, but he declines to do so. Rather than a demonstration of craven 
uxoriousness, permitting Eve to separate from him shows that Adam is bravely willing to 
take the chance that Eve will not return so that he might have proof of the voluntary 
nature of her presence if and when she does return. This act also provides Eve with the 
same such evidence, although this seems to be more of Adam’s than Eve’s motive which 
is more an attempt to establish herself as a separate individual from Adam.  
For Eve, voluntariness is more than just the choice to continue as Adam’s 
companion; it must also include a separate will. She must prove to herself that she is an 
entity separate from Adam with a will of her own. The Argument for Book Nine states 
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that “Eve loath to be thought not circumspect or firm enough, urges her going apart, the 
rather desirous to make tryal of her strength” (Milton’s italics). Eve feels the need to 
assert herself as circumspect and strong enough to be separate to prove that she is in fact 
separate. She desires to prove her presence as voluntary, but moreover to prove to herself 
that she is able to be alone, to be apart from Adam, to be separate from him and yet 
maintain a meaningful existence: to make trial of her strength. Milton’s statement in 
Areopagitica about untested virtue serves as a good explanation for Eve’s apparent need 
to separate: 
I cannot praise a fugitive and cloister’d vertue, unexercis’d & unbreath’d, 
that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, 
where that immortall garland is to be run for, not without dust and heat. 
Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much 
rather: that which purifies us is triall, and triall is by what is contrary.  
(1006) 
Eve needs to uncloister her virtue, to get it out in the open.  She needs to prove to herself 
and to those who have demeaned her character and her intelligence that she is a person of 
consequence in her own right and not just an appurtenance to Adam.  
Milton’s use in the above quotation of such athletically based metaphors as 
exercise, breathing, and the awarding of a garland for the winning of a race are apropos 
here, and correspond tidily to the idea of exercise being used to strengthen the virtue as it 
would the body. For Eve, the trial is the thing that will confirm her individuation, for 
“what is Faith, Love, Vertue unassaid . . . ?” (9.335). Eve’s separation from Adam is a 
personification of Milton’s belief in the need to put virtue to trial. Eve is determined to 
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make trial of herself and prove her worth independent of Adam. She doubtless expects to 
be honored as a victor upon her return and to find herself, “more equal, and perhaps, / A 
thing not undesireable” (9.823-4). By permitting Eve to sally forth to meet her adversary, 
Adam endorsed the breathing and the exercise of Eve’s virtue, and the idea that “that 
which purifies us is triall.”  
Eve’s insistence on working separate from Adam demonstrates a drastic change 
from her earlier position. In Book Four she told Adam, “what thou bidst / Unargu’d I 
obey; so God ordains, / God is thy Law, thou mine: to know no more / Is womans 
happiest knowledge and her praise” (4.635-8). This change is indicative of a kind of 
maturation or at least a change in comportment on Eve’s part. She has evidently grown 
dissatisfied with her circumstance as Adam’s accoutrement, and has resolved to pursue 
her individuation despite Adam’s wishes to the contrary. She has indeed become satiated 
with Adam’s converse, or at least his control, and has decided that the route to her 
continued happiness does not necessarily always go through him. It may well be that 
Adam’s caution regarding the possibility of the presence of Satan may have made the 
separation additionally appealing for her because “triall is by what is contrary.” Adam 
has made it clear that he is against the idea of separation, yet he supplies Eve with a 
tempting excuse for doing so: “But if much converse perhaps / Thee satiate, to short 
absence I could yield. / For solitude somtimes is best societie” (9.248-9), an excuse that 
as Lewalski points out, had not previously occurred to her. Lewalski indicates the 
ineffectuality of this move on Adam’s part: 
Besides offering a better rationale for going than any she has thought of, 
Adam unwittingly intensifies the psychological pressure on her by his 
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repeated imperatives – ‘Go…go…rely…do’ – making it much more 
difficult for her to stay without seeming to back down ignominiously. It 
was not Adam’s place in prelapsarian Eden to command Eve to stay and 
thereby control her free choice in the moral sphere; but neither was it his 
place to help her choose such a dangerous course of action by giving over 
his proper leadership role.  (485) 
Adam has effectively called Eve’s bluff and forced her hand, but had he not, she would 
have needed to find another excuse because she is determined to individuate herself from 
Adam. But while Lewalski’s point acknowledging Adam’s conflicted position is well-
taken, she is buying into the accusation of uxoriousness against him. Crediting Adam 
with supplying her “better rationale” discounts Eve’s determination “to make tryal of her 
strength” and ignores that she is “loath to be thought not circumspect or firm enough.” 
Eve did not require nor recognize any contribution from Adam to her arguments, and had 
resolved before she spoke to him to do as she had planned unless he forbade her to do so, 
so this “better rationale” he provided was not a contribution that Eve valued.  
 Just as there must be a viable choice not to obey for obedience to be genuine and 
worthy of merit, so too must virtue be tested in order to establish that it is indeed virtue 
and not mere happenstance. Virtue unchallenged—“fugitive and cloister’d”—is virtue 
that has never made nor been given the opportunity to make correct choices which are the 
only determinant of merit. Eve’s determination to make trial of herself was not to be 
denied, and had her pretext of maintenance of the garden been subverted, she would no 
doubt have found some other. Hermine Van Nuis has observed that Eve “requires some 
solitude, it seems, to adjust her image of Adam and to revise, as a result, the perception of 
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her own.” (51).  Eve wishes to prove to herself and to Adam as well that she is capable of 
the circumspection and strength that are required of an independent individual, thereby 
establishing herself as worthy of self-love as well as his love: “A thing not undesireable, 
somtime / Superior: for inferior who is free?” (9.825); thus she will adjust her image of 
herself to prove herself a capable individual, a free agent worthy of Adam, an equal in 
some respects, and perhaps even a “somtime superior.” Sometime superior”-ity equates 
to freedom for Eve; Godhead, even.  
 
Appeal of Godhead 
The foremost reason for Eve’s pursuit of Godhead is her belief that more 
knowledge will make her “more equal” to Adam, and that being “more equal” will make 
her more appealing. In saying that “growing up to Godhead; which for thee / Chiefly I 
sought, without thee can despise” (9.877-8), she has stated that the chief appeal of 
Godhead for her is the increased appeal that it will give her in Adam’s eyes. Godhead to 
Eve amounts essentially to equality, and her definition of equality is a state where one is 
sometimes more equal than the other; sometimes superior, sometimes inferior. To be 
always inferior is to be less than equal, and to be less than equal is to be less than free—
and thus less appealing to Adam. She perceives her limited self-determination as the 
source of their inequality for although she possesses a modicum of self-determination it is 
evidently not to the same degree as Adam’s. He needn’t ask her permission for anything, 
yet she must ask his. She believes that to be less equal must be a thing undesirable, and 
perceives this inequality as a failing in herself, rather than as intrinsic to her nature. If she 
believed that it were innate, she would despair of changing it. She believes that the 
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imbalance of knowledge between her and Adam is the failing from which their inequality 
springs. Knowledge is what wants in “femal sex” (9.822), and knowledge is not intrinsic 
or innate; it is acquired; thus equality can be acquired. Consequently, the tree of 
knowledge is more tempting to her than it is to Adam. Eating the fruit of the tree of 
knowledge will obviate these failings, “feed at once both Bodie and Mind” (9.779). 
Adam, perceiving no such lack within himself, is therefore not tempted by the fruit of the 
tree of knowledge. When he eats the fruit, he does so to avoid the prospect of being 
permanently separated from Eve.  
Satan’s sales pitch to Eve for the tree of knowledge focuses on the qualities with 
which it will imbue her. When he says, “look on mee, / Mee who have touch'd and tasted, 
yet both live, / And life more perfet have attaind then Fate / Meant mee, by ventring 
higher then my Lot” (9.687-90), he directly addresses her fear of remaining as she is, “not 
circumspect or firm enough,” and not advancing. An increase in knowledge is what will 
make her “as Gods, / Knowing both Good and Evil as they know” (9.708-9). Eve’s 
interest in or attempt at Godhead, sinister as it may sound, is merely her effort to find and 
maintain a degree of autonomy or equality, to achieve a degree of selfhood separate from 
Adam. She perceives Adam to be godly because of his superiority. Eve’s last unfallen 
musings, her final thoughts before she eats the fruit are of the promise of the increase in 
knowledge and verbal ability that the fruit reputedly brings, the keys to her escape from 
the subjugated status under which she toils. She asks, “In plain then, what forbids he but 
to know, / Forbids us good, forbids us to be wise? / Such prohibitions binde not” (9.753-
60). She believes that the prohibitions do not bind her because they are being used to 
oppress her unjustly. The fruit will remedy “our want” (9.755) and if he “forbids us to be 
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wise,” he does so unjustly (“Not just, not God”), and therefore she believes that she is 
free to disobey. Eve, while delighting in the fruit, is excited at the prospect of the increase 
in knowledge she is about to undergo: “through expectation high / Of knowledg, nor was 
God-head from her thought” (9.788-90). Eve, having been created “for God in him,” puts 
Adam on the same level as God. So her perception of Godhead is more what separates 
her from Adam than what separates Adam from God. Therefore her pursuit of Godhead is 
really nothing more to her than the pursuit of equality with Adam, not God.  
To Eve the promise of Godhead with which Satan has enticed her is what will 
make her more like Adam and therefore more appealing to Adam. To be more equal is to 
be more desirable and more free. Eve seeks this equality, this Godhead, not as a boon in 
its own right, but as a device to make her more appealing to Adam, whose perception of 
her is always foremost among her concerns. He may not have been her first thought upon 
tasting of the forbidden fruit, but she thought of him soon thereafter:  
     But to Adam in what sort 
Shall I appeer? shall I to him make known 
As yet my change, and give him to partake 
Full happiness with mee, or rather not, 
But keep the odds of Knowledge in my power  
Without Copartner? so to add what wants 
In Femal Sex, the more to draw his Love, 
And render me more equal, and perhaps, 
A thing not undesireable, somtime 
Superior: for inferior who is free?   (9.816-25). 
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And her thoughts center on what Adam will think. She wonders if she should share the 
blessing of the fruit with him or withhold it, so as not to surrender her advantage so 
readily. She believes that the increase in knowledge will make her more lovable, more 
desirable, more equal, and more free. She equates knowledge with equality and equality 




It is important to establish the motivation behind Eve’s separation from Adam 
because understanding the motivation might serve to determine who was at fault in their 
fall from grace. During their life in the Eden of Paradise Lost, Eve underwent more than 
two separations from Adam: “Oft he to her his charge of quick returne / Repeated” 
(9.399-400), but Milton chooses to detail only two of them. Kerrigan and Braden 
maintain that the motivations for the two separations are different: 
Twice in the poem Eve has desired solitude. When she departs from the 
dinnertime symposium, it is for the sake of erotic delay; Adam will 
intermix his account with "Grateful digression, and solve high dispute / 
With conjugal caresses, from his lip / Not words alone pleased her" (8.55-
57). But in the next book the motive for her solitude includes some sense 
of oppressive closeness, “so near each other thus all day” (9.220), some 
souring on the sweet flirtation of their daytime eroticism. Accomplishment 
is more to her liking: “Looks intervene and smiles” (9.222). As it turns 
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out, delay is one thing, absence another. For the absence of Adam gives 
Eve over to his rival the solitude and singularity of her image. (46) 
The two separations had different consequences because the circumstances were 
different. The first separation from Adam was of little consequence, whereas the 
consequence of the second separation was more dire, but Eve’s reasons for departing are 
less distinct from one episode of separation to the next than is maintained by these two 
critics. The idea of accomplishment as her motivation is erroneous, and the narcissistic 
inclination of which they accuse her is misapplied. Eve did try to use the alibi of 
“accomplishment” of maintaining the garden as her explanation to Adam for the second 
separation, but Adam treats it as an obvious pretext, as can be seen from his reaction: 
“These paths & Bowers doubt not but our joynt hands / Will keep from Wilderness with 
ease, as wide / As we need walk” (9.244-6). The garden has gotten along fine without the 
benefit of such careful husbandry in the past, and there is no reason to believe that it is 
required now. Kerrigan and Braden assert that “the absence of Adam gives Eve over to 
his rival the solitude and singularity of her image” (46), but when Eve seeks solitude, it 
not as these critics contend to seek out her image in the reflecting pool. When Eve 
separated from Adam ostensibly to work unmolested in a corner of the garden, “from her 
husband’s hand her hand / Soft she withdrew; and, like a Wood-Nymph light, / Oread or 
Dryad, or of Delia’s train, / Betook her to the groves” (9.385-8), she betook herself to the 
groves, not to the water. She is not seeking solitude to look for her own image reflected 
in the pool of water, but rather she is seeking solitude to improve her self-image which 
she believes will in turn improve Adam’s image of her. Her two-fold reasoning for the 
two separations is geared toward upgrading her status with Adam.   
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Eve sees the separation from Adam as a way to increase her appeal to Adam, not 
to increase her distance from him. The short retirement will give her an opportunity for 
self-discovery and individuation which will in turn increase her appeal to Adam. As 
Kerrigan and Braden have implied in using such terms as “oppressive closeness” and 
“souring” Eve has determined that it is possible to have too much of a good thing and that 
periodic separation from Adam is a sound practice that may prevent his ardor for her 
from cooling due to surfeit of exposure: “For solitude somtimes is best societie” (9.249). 
She believes that she must cultivate her time spent with Adam in order to maintain the 
interest that he has for her already. Eve’s solitude is not Adam’s rival. Eve’s Solitude is 
her avenue for self-discovery, not self-admiration. She feels that the more she improves 
herself, the more appealing Adam will find her: “which for thee / Chiefly I sought, 
without thee can despise” (9.877-8), and the occasional separation will serve to make 
their reunions more enjoyable.  
As Kerrigan and Braden assert, the sense of “erotic delay” does serve as Eve’s 
motivation in the first separation, but it plays a stronger part in the second than they 
imagine. The “erotic delay” of which Kerrigan and Braden speak corresponds to the 
“sweet returne” that is Eve’s real motivation for both separations. The first separation of 
Eve from Adam that Milton sees fit to document occurred in Book 8, occasioned by her 
preference for Adam over Raphael in whose conversation regarding celestial matters Eve 
was little concerned and in which she was little interested. Eve excuses herself so that she 
might have the story of their conversation related to her by Adam alone: “she sole 
Auditress; / Her Husband the Relater she preferr’d” (8.50-1). But her plan comes to 
naught as Book 8 ends with Adam returning late, “in the thick shade” (8.653) to the 
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bower with no retelling forthcoming; Eve’s ambition unfulfilled. This first separation 
failed to produce the desired result: “this pure and more inbred desire of joyning to it 
selfe in conjugall fellowship a fit conversing soul (which desire is properly call’d love) is 
stronger then death” (Doctrine 940). The second separation from Adam was Eve’s 
second attempt to accomplish the first goal. Eve’s motive for both separations is the 
same: an opportunity for “sweet returne,” made dearer by “short retirement” (9.250). 
Adam later confirms that desire to be, indeed, “stronger then death” by choosing to eat 




Satan exploits Eve’s desire to be more appealing to Adam, but his expert 
temptation of Eve centers not on appeals to her vanity as has been ordinarily assumed, 
but on an appeal to her intellect and this desire to individuate her self by increasing her 
intellectual capacity. He begins by speaking flatteringly about her beauty, “Thy looks, the 
Heav'n of mildness” (9.530), but he flatters her mind especially, treating her as an 
individual, as a person of consequence, “Empress of this fair World” (9.568), in and of 
herself without regard to Adam. She is entranced by Satan’s attentions, and “Into the 
Heart of Eve his words made way” (9.550). But Eve listens more closely and is tempted 
most surely when the serpent describes the effects of the fruit upon his own intellect: “ere 
long I might perceive / Strange alteration in me, to degree / Of Reason in my inward 
Powers, and Speech” (9.598-600). With his blandishments, the serpent mixes in hints of 
how the fruit will increase Eve’s substantiality, make her a person of consequence that 
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Adam will respect as well as love. The serpent describes to Eve the kind of thoughts that 
the fruit causes him to have, “Thenceforth to Speculations high or deep / I turnd my 
thoughts, and with capacious mind / Considerd all things visible in Heav'n, / Or Earth, or 
Middle, all things fair and good” (9.602-5), thoughts of intellectual substance similar to 
the content of conversations between Adam and Raphael, even between Adam and God. 
Now the serpent has Eve’s undivided attention. She is tempted most strongly by 
this opportunity for an increase of intellectual substance that presumably will make her 
converse more satisfying to Adam and obviate the need for him to converse with the likes 
of Raphael. He incites her lust for knowledge with an onslaught of words rising in a 
crescendo of ideas each the more tantalizing to her: 
O Sacred, Wise, and Wisdom-giving Plant, 
Mother of Science, Now I feel thy Power  
Within me cleere, not onely to discerne 
Things in thir Causes, but to trace the wayes 
Of highest Agents, deemd however wise. (9.679-83) 
Queen of this Universe, doe not believe 
Those rigid threats of Death; ye shall not Die:  
How should ye? by the Fruit? it gives you Life 
To Knowledge.  (9.684-7) 
The promise of the power of the fruit to make causation clear, and to afford an 
understanding of higher agency, the promise to make abstruse subject matter more plain 
is what tempts Eve most sorely. Satan hints that she has already been deceived by those 
whom she had most trusted, Adam and God, and that they had suppressed her by 
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withholding from her the knowledge that she so craved which would have made her 
Adam’s intellectual equal. He anoints her queen of the universe, even before the fruit 
with its attendant knowledge of good and evil changes hands, suggesting that this is what 
she has always been, and that she is by nature entitled to this knowledge that has been 
hidden from her by trickery and empty threats of dire consequence: 
But the coup de grace delivered by Satan, the particular pitch that sells Eve on the 
fruit and causes her to fall, comes in lines 708-9 when the serpent tells her that: “ye shall 
be as Gods, / Knowing both good and evil, as they know,” this is the temptation that Eve 
finds irresistible. This is when she falls, at the offer of the chance to be ‘as Gods,’ Gods 
who determine their own fate, know the answer to questions of good and evil, go where 
they want to go, and ask no one for permission: 
That whoso eats thereof, forthwith attains  
Wisdom without their leave? and wherein lies  
The offence, that man should thus attain to know?  
What can your knowledge hurt him, or this tree  
Impart against his will, if all be his? (9.724-8) 
This is the Godhead that Eve is in pursuit of when she convinces Adam to let her separate 
from him. This is wherein all the questions about her status and place in the world are for 
her answered.  
 Eve is enthralled by these proposals of the serpent who offers to her a supposed 
source of the qualities, the lack of which she perceives to be the distinction between her 
and Adam, the perceived inferiority and subordination caused by her lack of the skill of 
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contemplation. This is Godhead to her. In one of the most-discussed passages of the 
poem,  
   though both  
Not equal, as thir sex not equal seemd; 
For contemplation hee and valour formd, 
For softness shee and sweet attractive Grace, 
Hee for God only, shee for God in him. (4.295-9) 
Eve is described as ‘not equal’ to Adam; demeaned as merely soft and attractive, not a 
thing of consequence as is the contemplative Adam; a thing not worthy of God’s 
consideration in her own right, but only as she relates to Adam. To Eve, the fruit offers 
the opportunity to right these perceived wrongs. By grace of the fruit, she can:  
    keep the odds of Knowledge in my power  
Without Copartner? so to add what wants 
In Femal Sex, the more to draw his Love, 
And render me more equal, and perhaps, 
A thing not undesireable, somtime 
Superior: for inferior who is free? (9. 820-5) 
She can become a thing more equal by the access to knowledge; sometime superior 
because she will retain her sweet attractive grace and acquire the additional grace of the 
power of contemplation. She can if she so desires keep the knowledge to herself, not 
share it with Adam who seems to have foregone to share it with her; this is real self-
determination, free will at last. While she may have been created for Adam, she need no 
longer be just for God in him, but can be for God in her own right by adding what wants 
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in the female sex, this power of contemplation. She believes that this quality will more 
draw Adam’s love to her: that she can finally fulfill “Adam’s most fervent desire,” that 
Adam will more love a thing sometime superior than the flibbertigibbet that Raphael and 




To a large extent, Paradise Lost revolves around the concept of self-determination 
or free will, a notion which permeates Milton’s life as well as much of his writing. It is a 
defining factor in his perception of obedience and a determining factor in his personal 
conduct. Free will determined his choice of religion, his political stance, and his 
conception of how a marriage should be conducted. In the Tenure of Kings, Milton 
addresses the subject of self-determination and states unequivocally that he considers 
freedom to be an inborn attribute of mankind: “No man who knows ought, can be so 
stupid to deny that all men naturally were borne free, being the image and resemblance of 
God himself, and were by privilege above all the creatures, born to command and not to 
obey: and that they liv’d so” (1060). That mankind is born free, intended and created as 
such by God is to Milton the most basic principle of life on earth. But in Paradise Lost, 
the implications of that free will upon Eve’s status as an individual are never fully 
resolved by Milton. The difficulty arises in the attempt to establish precisely to what 
degree womankind as a constituent of mankind should and does share in this happy state 
of self-determination that he describes as an inborn component of mankind, and what 
limitations are placed upon that self-determination by the seemingly contradictory 
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subordinate status that Milton’s God endorses as a native component of the nature of 
womankind.  
Milton’s assertions about the free will of humanity do not correspond precisely 
with his descriptions regarding Eve and her status as subordinate to Adam. The 
unqualified self-determination to which Eve should be entitled as a constituent of 
mankind is called into question when she makes apparently self-determined actions but is 
not held fully responsible for these actions. Eve, as a rational being, is supposedly created 
as fully free. If she is indeed fully self-determined, she alone should be responsible for 
her actions. In blaming Adam in whole or in part for Eve’s actions, Milton’s God 
presents him as Eve’s superior and caretaker which is inconsistent with her responsibility 
for her own actions. Milton does more closely approximate free agency and self-
determination for womankind than was the popular belief of his day, but he fails to fully 
resolve that womankind is included in the definition of mankind, thus failing to 
satisfactorily resolve this problem or its general implications for womankind.  
Milton approaches a full participation in the benefits of humanity for womankind, 
but is unable to bring himself to fully include them due to his apparent desire to maintain 
their subordinate status. In The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, while discussing 
Adam’s desires for a mate, Milton refers to the need for “a ready and reviving associate 
in marriage” (939), and he speaks of a “pure and more inbred desire of joining to it selfe 
in conjugall fellowship a fit conversing soul” (940). Neither the idea of an “associate” nor 
of “fellowship” can be said to categorically indicate an endorsement of equality between 
a man and a woman, but it is difficult to imagine words that would more closely 
approximate such an endorsement. But in Tetrachordon, published a year later, he 
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contradicts that sentiment and makes it clear that equality is not what he has in mind, 
stating: “Nevertheless man is not to hold her as a servant, but receives her into a part of 
that empire which God proclaims him to, though not equally, yet largely, as his own 
image and glory: for it is no small glory to him, that a creature so like him, should be 
made subject to him” (1030). Milton’s own words in this quotation indicate the gap 
through which he allows Eve as representative of woman to fall when he uses the phrase 
“into a part [my emphasis] of that empire which God proclaims him to,” indicating that 
he believes Eve’s constituency in humanity to be only partial, and thus her free will to be 
limited, and he believes her to be—as a wife—“made subject to him,” her husband.   
When contrasted with such phrases as “a fit conversing soul” and “conjugall 
fellowship” these early writings of Milton’s confirm the impression that this conflicted 
idea of how the treatment of womankind should proceed was a long-standing concern of 
Milton’s. His conception of womankind continued to develop throughout his lifetime 
toward a more enlightened view on the status of women, and by the time he published 
Paradise Lost, his ideas about the subject seemed comparatively highly evolved. Milton’s 
lifelong fondness and respect for the biblical Eve appears to have been in long-standing 
conflict with the biblical exegesis of St. Paul who, as a result of God’s judgment against 
Eve that “he shall rule over you” (Gen. 3:16), felt that womankind should be treated as 
subordinate to man. These two opposing sentiments pulled Milton back and forth, and 
whenever he tended toward a more equitable understanding of the position of women, the 
Pauline admonition: “Wives be subject to your husbands as is fit in the Lord, Coloss. 3. 
18. In every thing, Eph. 5. 24” (1030) seemed to pull him back to the old way of thinking. 
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Throughout much of his writing, Milton evinced an especial fondness for the 
converse between men and women and averred its crucial importance to the continued 
happiness of participants in a marriage.  His fondness for convivial converse is evident 
throughout the text of Paradise Lost. Demaray recognizes the importance of converse to 
Milton, as well as the confounding position he takes toward women. “So much hangs on 
crucial references by John Milton to ‘converse’ and ‘conversation’ in the prose and 
Paradise Lost that the terms, when freshly reassessed, afford unique insight into the 
vexing issue of Milton’s very individualized views on women, marriage, and divorce” 
(23). Milton’s views on women are individualized just as are his views on religion, and it 
is likely the former is a result of the latter. His individual version of Christianity 
infiltrates his thinking on everything and results in views that are certainly not in close 
lock-step with others of his time, but at the same time are not necessarily fully consistent 
within themselves either.  
The God and Adam of Paradise Lost can be seen to represent the two 
differentiated sides of Milton’s conflicted attitude toward the free will of Eve, and by 
extension, womankind. God creates man with free will as a necessary component of his 
nature: “I formd them free, and free they must remain / . . . I else must change / Thir 
nature, and revoke the high Decree / Unchangeable, Eternal, which ordain’d / Thir 
freedom” (3.124-8). He wants his creation Adam to have free will, but, having essentially 
made a gift to him of Eve, Milton’s God is less committed to Eve’s free will and more 
interested in Eve remaining subordinate to Adam. God seems to be trying to protect that 
superior status for Adam when He scolds him for listening to Eve’s voice when he should 
have been hearkening only to God’s. Conversely, Adam seems to think and act as if 
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Eve’s free will is more important to him than her subordinate status. He does not balk at 
being the superior so much as it appears to interfere with his own agenda which includes 
his desire to be certain of Eve’s unforced love for him. Her status as subordinate 
interferes with his ability to acquire that information with certitude. Milton’s God wants 
Eve to be subordinate to Adam, but the free will that He claims to have included as an 
inalterable part of her being and nature as a constituent of humanity interferes with that 
aim.  
As a result of this conflict, God appears to suffer from a lack of foresight. God’s 
promise to Adam that “What next I bring shall please thee, be assr’d, / Thy likeness, thy 
fit help, thy other self, / Thy wish, exactly to thy hearts desire” (8.449-51), does not seem 
to be fulfilled to the degree that, as a promise of God, it should be. God’s creation of Eve 
as the fulfillment of Adam’s wish and exact heart’s desire is corrupted by God’s desire to 
fit Eve to His own specifications, as well. The separation scene gives Adam the 
opportunity to decline to compel Eve even when he has reason, ability, and authority to 
do so, thus establishing Adam’s respect for Eve’s right to make her own choices about 
her autonomy, and that he too, like God, believes in free will: “beyond this had bin force, 
/ And force upon free Will hath here no place” (9.1173-4). This reluctance of Adam’s to 
compel Eve to follow his wishes allows Milton to portray the marriage of Adam and Eve 
as an ideal one, since “a marriage containing any aspect of compulsion is no marriage 
according to Milton” (Magro 102). But the ideal marriage does not evidently belong in 
paradise. 
Milton’s work to establish free will as an integral part of human nature bears fruit 
in the Book 9 labor debate and separation scene. It is no exaggeration by Van Nuis to 
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write “the division of labor debate is thus pivotal within the poem, functioning both 
prospectively and retrospectively. Inspired by preceding dialogues, it provides the 
critical, hence deciding (from Gr. krinein, "crisis"), moment on which the future of Adam 
and Eve individually and collaterally depends” (54). The labor debate sets up the 
respective arguments that Adam and Eve will use to decide upon the separation, but it is 
the actual separation that is really the pivotal scene in the poem because until the words 
are translated into the actions that they are intended to justify, they remain only words, 
abstractions that have little or no meaning without actions to make them concrete. And, 
as Eve demonstrated upon excusing herself from the conversation between Raphael and 
Adam, she is not as interested in abstractions as are the other rational creatures in the 
story. She is more concerned with how these abstractions act upon her, and affect her 
happiness.  
The attempt to illustrate free will serves as Milton’s justification for his alterations 
of the biblical version of the story of the loss of paradise. Milton must separate the pair to 
make salient their personal, differentiated responsibility for their actions. To cogently 
justify the ways of God to man, he needs to establish that the two individuals are 
responsible for their own actions and therefore deserve their individual punishments. The 
most effective way to accomplish this goal is to differentiate their actions. If the couple is 
together at the eating of the fruit, then the areas of responsibility are blurred. As separate 
actors, they establish themselves as separate entities with distinct responsibilities. The 
separation allows Eve to actually exercise her autonomy and free will in a substantive 
manner, and to realize the consequences of that exercise as brought about by a reasonable 
and just God. Eve’s separation from Adam gives Milton the opportunity to establish 
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Eve’s bona fides as a free agent, and to show her as individually responsible for her own 
actions and deserving of her separate punishment.  
 The separation of Adam and Eve also provides Eve with the impetus to 
differentiate herself from Adam which is chief among her ambitions. Eve separates from 
Adam in an attempt to individuate herself from him, to establish that she has an identity 
separate from him, with meaning and value of its own, as well as opinions and values of 
her own that are not necessarily drawn from Adam’s and are not necessarily in agreement 
with his. Van Nuis avers that “by literally separating herself from Adam’s presence, she 
also takes the leap first to become a differentiated self” (54). The separation scene affords 
Eve the opportunity to “make triall of herself,” to individuate herself as an entity separate 
from Adam, and not as merely a part of him. This Evian enterprise is given the somewhat 
distracting label of the pursuit of Godhead which undeservedly tinctures Eve with a 
blasphemous flavor. James Stone argues that “from Eve’s point of view, only by severing 
herself from Adam can she assure herself of a female identity that is not simply identical 
to Adam’s male identity” (36-7). Before Eve is individuated from Adam, it is possible to 
perceive them as a single entity of a single (perhaps indistinguishable) sex (hence one 
flesh, perhaps). If she is a part of Adam, she can not be beloved of him because she is of 
him; being constantly at his side renders Eve indistinguishable from himself in Adam’s 
eyes; he becomes unable to imagine himself separate from Eve, and unable to think of her 
as separate from himself. For Eve, individuation is a way to separate herself from Adam 
and to consequently bring them closer. By separating from Adam, Eve is cultivating her 
relationship to Adam in much the same way she has proposed to cultivate their garden: 
rather than allowing it to overgrow, wild and unfettered, she is husbanding her relation 
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with her husband. As she sees it, by being occasionally absent, she is seeing to it that 
Adam is able to rue her absence occasionally, and thereby rejoice in her return. The 
separation gives Eve the opportunity to achieve a degree of individuation that would 
otherwise have been unavailable to her, to separate herself from Adam both literally and 
figuratively.  
Adam in turn must allow Eve to leave his side to provide her with the opportunity 
to return to his side voluntarily, thus confirming that she wished to be there all along, and 
casting aside any suspicion he may have had that their connection is by “forc’t yoke.” 
While separated, Eve is able to assay her virtue as well as her love for Adam, and to 
prove her love to Adam upon her return. Because she makes a choice that is contrary to 
his wishes, and because that choice leads to an actual physical separation of the couple, 
Eve’s separation from Adam supplies the only genuine incontrovertible evidence of 
Eve’s free will. Free will is choice; it is the presence of options with the option to choose 
among them. If Eve is never permitted to leave Adam’s side, or even if she never wishes 
or asks to, she can not be considered a free agent, and therefore can not be held 
responsible for her actions; she would truly therefore be Adam’s subordinate and thus his 
responsibility. Separation confirms the voluntary nature of Eve’s presence. Voluntariness 
too is choice, the option to do or not do. According to Revard,  
Eve herself has argued (ix.322-41) that if she and Adam are compelled to 
remain inseparable, “in narrow circuit straitn’d by a Foe,” that they 
possess neither happiness nor liberty. Happiness cannot exist without 
liberty and liberty can function only if man and woman are permitted 
independently to affirm “Faith Love, Virtue” by trial. (73). 
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If Eve is not given the chance to exercise that liberty, to establish her identity as separate 
from Adam’s, she can not then affirm that faith, love, and liberty to Adam or even to 
herself, and Adam can then never be certain that she remains with him out of a real desire 
to do so, rather than lack of any opportunity to do otherwise. Happiness, like 
responsibility, cannot rightly exist in the absence of liberty. Voluntariness is the 
harbinger and partner of free will and is necessary for Milton’s conception of marriage. 
Without the liberty to do otherwise, Eve can never be certain that her free will is anything 
but lip service nor can she be certain in her own mind of why she stays.  For Adam to be 
happy, Eve must be happy. To be sure that Eve is happy, Adam must be convinced of the 
voluntary nature of her presence, therefore he must give her liberty; he must permit her to 
separate from him.  
Satan’s success as tempter is reliant not on his appeal to Eve’s vanity, but to her 
desire for Godhead, which is really a desire to improve her situation. Like the accusation 
of uxoriousness against Adam, accusations of vanity, inconstancy, and concupiscence 
frequently attend Eve, and have been oft-blamed for Satan’s success as a seducer. But 
vanity for Eve is not an end in itself. It is a means to maintain her appeal. Throughout her 
existence, it has been made clear to her that the chief quality that she has to offer is her 
beauty. The vanity of which she is so often accused is merely her absorption of what she 
has been told about her worth and attempting to use it to her best advantage. The ideals of 
equality, free will, and individuation, are what appeal to Eve, and not as tools to escape or 
surpass Adam, but to bring herself closer to him, and he to her. 
 Responsibility and free will are the real subject matter of Paradise Lost. We are 
told in the first sentence of the argument to the first book of “the whole Subject, Mans 
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disobedience,” but that disobedience serves to illustrate that man has free will to obey or 
disobey, and that he alone is responsible for which he chooses: “Man is the occasion of 
his owne miseries.” The separation of Adam and Eve allows Milton to show the manifold 
ways in which free will is important to Adam and Eve in particular and to humanity in 
general, to hold Adam and Eve individually responsible for their actions, and to illustrate 
the responsibility that free will entails. Adam is responsible for allowing Eve to withdraw 
her hand from his, for valuing Eve’s autonomy above the directive to obey God above all 
else. Eve’s responsibility lies in her suit for autonomy, which she saw as her way to 
improved status with regard to her husband, thus putting her marriage above the edict to 
obey God. Both are responsible not one more than the other because they both committed 
the same sin of eating the fruit in spite of the edict not to do so. So while the epic voice 
blames Adam for uxoriousness and blames Eve for failing to brook restraint, these are not 
the real sins. Adam and Eve’s sin was that they each valued their marriage to one another 
more highly than they did their obligation to God. The sin for both Adam and Eve was 
disobedience pure and simple. They disobeyed God’s edict that they worship Him above 
all else. Milton’s sin is in his failure to fully realize the implications of his equating self-
determination with humanity and the consequences this had for the status of womankind 
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